Philosophy in Bankruptcy by Carlson, David Gray
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 85 
Issue 5 Issue 5&6 
1987 
Philosophy in Bankruptcy 
David Gray Carlson 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David G. Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1987). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol85/iss5/44 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
PHILOSOPHY IN BANKRUPTCY 
David Gray Carlson* 
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LA w. By Thomas H. Jack-
son. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 
287. $25. 
In The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Thomas Jackson re-
works his recent law review articles into a book that attempts to be a 
coherent jurisprudence of federal bankruptcy law. Undoubtedly, the 
book will find some admirers among people who think that bad law-
and-economics is better than no law-and-economics, 1 but virtually all 
other audiences will find the book badly wanting. The book is un-
helpful in solving hard interpretive problems.2 No important sociolog-
ical issues are discussed or even mentioned. 3 On its own chosen 
ground of generality, Jackson's vision of the rationality in bankruptcy 
law is internally inconsistent and hopelessly ad hoc. 
Jackson's basic technique is to filter bankruptcy law through a 
"creditor's bargain" model. In this model, anyone who loses his or 
her entitlements in bankruptcy is shown to have consented in advance 
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
B.A. 1974, University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D. 1977, Hastings Law School. - Ed. 
I would like to thank numerous persons for their helpful suggestions, including William W. 
Bratton, Jr., Anthony D'Amato, Steve Diamond, Richard Friedman, Arthur Jacobson, Lynn 
LoPucki, Michel Rosenfeld, David Rudenstine, Jeanne Schroeder, Paul Shupack, Stewart Sterk, 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Peter Tillers, Elizabeth Warren, Charles Yablon, and Barry Za-
retsky, to name a few. 
1. See A. Kronman, Flyleaf to THE Lome AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LA w ("I cannot 
think of any book on bankruptcy that is comparable to this in breadth or theoretical sophistica-
tion."). I assume Kronman likes the book and is not hurling a terrible anathema at the bibliogra-
phy. See also Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic (Book Review), 
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 690 (1986). In this review of a bankruptcy casebook coauthored by Jackson, 
Robert Scott expresses the view that the contractarian heuristic developed by Jackson is "power-
ful," id. at 692, and a "significant advance," id. at 694, but he is astonished that contractarianism 
fails to explain current bankruptcy doctrine. 
However, you can't fool all of the people all of the time. See Countryman, The Concept of a 
Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 713, 823-25, 827 (1985) (attacking the 
assumptions which fuel Jackson's hypothetical consent of creditors who are forced to give back 
preferences). 
2. At times, Jackson does offer his views on interpretive questions, but they are almost al-
ways driven by his controversial norms of contractarianism and bankruptcy neutrality. There-
fore, practitioners have to believe (or have to believe judges believe) Jackson's normative theories 
before they will find his legal analysis of any use. 
3. I take these problems to include: (1) How can we best control expenditures by lawyers 
and accountants who have every incentive to work inefficiently in pursuit of the creditors' inter-
ests? (2) How can the holdout power of junior creditors be curtailed without treading upon their 
due process rights? (3) What is the effect. (if any) of generous discharge and wage earners' plans 
on the moral fabric of our society? 
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to the loss. Somewhat separately, Jackson believes that bankruptcy 
should be totally neutral about property entitlements created by state 
law. Otherwise, "incentives" are created.4 
In this essay, I will present some criticisms of these two proposi-
tions. My conclusion will be that, at his best, Jackson rises to mere 
tautology. Beyond that, Jackson entangles himself in unreconciled 
contradictions and depends upon factual assertions that no one could 
accept as true. Almost never does he produce an insight that can sur-
vive serious scrutiny. 
I. JACKSON'S CONTRACTARIAN METHODOLOGY 
Jackson joins a distinguished coterie in pursuing contractarian the-
ory. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau also find in hypothetical contracts 
a means by which the postulate of individual sovereignty may be rec-
onciled with coercive government power. 5 The practice of con-
tractarian theorists is not to argue that any real human being has 
actually manifested consent. Instead, they present an essence of the 
human personality in the abstract, devoid of historic characteristics. 
These personalities are defined by a very limited number of attributes 
that the theorist perceives to be universal among humans. Defined by 
these limited attributes, such personalities, it is argued, would consent 
to socializing institutions that involve coercion and pain. 
Contractarians are often persuasive in arguing that humans (as 
they reconstitute them) would pursue the rationality dictated by the 
attributes and needs assigned to them and would indeed agree to fu-
ture coercion. 6 The controversial aspect of contractarian rhetoric is 
whether the theorist has introduced a plausible account of personality. 
If you don't agree that human beings have been abstracted fairly in the 
contractarian model, then the model fails to have any rhetorical 
value.7 
For this reason, most contractarians keep their hypothetical 
human beings highly abstract and simple. Rawls, for example, places 
4. "Bankruptcy neutrality" is my term. Jackson writes only about the evil of "incentives." 
A world without incentives can be described as neutral. Neutrality allows creditors and debtors 
to make optimal choices. See text at notes 116-18 infra. 
5. For an excellent account of contractarianism, see Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The 
Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. RBV. 769 
(1985) [hereinafter Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice]. 
6. See id. at 818 ("the ultimate criterion of whether a relationship is contractual in its deep 
structure is not the actual agreement of those involved, but rather the logical likelihood that 
those involved, acting as rational, self-interested individuals, would freely agree to the 
relationship"). 
7. In characterizing a contractarian model's value as "rhetorical," I follow Ronald Dworkin 
in assuming that contractarianism proves nothing about the ethical quality of an institution and 
simply serves as "a device for calling attention to some independent argument for the fairness of 
[an ethical proposition] - an argument that does not rest on the false premise that a hypothetical 
contract has some pale binding force." Dworkin, The Original Position, in READING RAWLS 16, 
19, 37 (N. Daniels ed. 1975); see also id. at 37. 
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human beings behind a veil of ignorance and strips them of any histo-
ricity. He is refreshingly candid about this process and goes so far as 
to admit that, in the end, his own version of contractarianism does not 
depend upon universal agreement at all. It is enough that one person 
thus abstracted would consent. 8 In the Rawlsian model, all people are 
so completely stripped down that they are precisely alike; a "bargain," 
strictly speaking, is not required.9 
Another important feature of contractarians such as Rousseau or 
Rawls is that they use their contractarian models to investigate only 
the most basic of human institutions. Given the fact that human be-
ings in such contractarian models are stripped of their historicity, no 
other strategy is possible. If these philosophers were to attribute real 
histories to the people in their hypothetical bargains, they would be-
come less and less likely to reach the stipulated bargain. It might still 
be open for the philosophers to argue that real historic people ought to 
agree, but infusing such oughts into the discussion deprives con-
tractarian philosophy of its major value: the ability to avoid, to a 
fairly great extent, the need to justify the truth of normative 
propositions. 
This implies that contractarianism is not a very effective technique 
to pursue economic efficiency. Unlike basic institutional questions, 
which depend upon very abstract assertions of human desire, efficiency 
requires a close analysis of precise historical attributes of human be-
ings.10 Identifying the ex ante state in which a loser would have con-
sented to a disadvantageous-but-efficient law almost always requires 
an ad hoc attribution of historic qualities to the person who would 
agree to take the loss. 11 However, in spite of the utilitarian's heavy 
reliance on historical attributes of persons, Archimedean contractari-
anism has attracted some law-and-economics professors12 precisely be-
cause it answers a very difficult ethical question about cost-benefit 
analysis: why should a person incur costs just so some other people 
can benefit? 
There are noncontractarian answers to this question of why a few 
8. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 139 (1971). 
9. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 77-99 (1982); see also Yablon, 
Arguing About Rights (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REv. 871, 877-79 (1987). 
10. "[U]tilitarian doctrine ... relies very heavily upon the natural facts and contingencies of 
human life in determining what forms of moral character are to be encouraged in ajust society." 
J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 32; see also Pence, Fair Contracts and Beautiful Intuitions, in NEW 
EssAYS ON CONTRACT THEORY 137, 144-45 (K. Nielsen & R. Shiner eds. 1977) (utilitarians 
cannot agree on specific principles that would be perpetually valid, because the circumstances of 
society change). 
11. See Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563, 578-79 (1980) (criticizing Rich-
ard Posner's contractarianism on this ground). 
12. For a persuasive argument which suggests that a chief difference between efficiency con-
tractarians (such as Posner) and deontological contractarians (such as Rawls) may be the willing-
ness to attribute knowledge of probabilities to people in the original position, see Hare, Rawls's 
Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS 81, 101-07 (N. Daniels ed. 1975). 
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should consent to suffer for the many, but they mostly involve the 
invocation of communitarian (Le., nonliberal) values. Efficiency con-
tractarians, however, tend to value the (contradictory) principles of 
individualism. This leads law-and-economics professors to the strat-
egy of showing that, irrespective of supererogatory ideals, selfish indi-
viduals would have consented to risk if they had been asked at a time 
long before their histories became known to them. This point in time 
is defined as one at which the present value of everyone's future entitle-
ments is maximized. Since people would consent to having more 
rather than less, Kaldor-Hicks efficient13 moves appear as though they 
are products of Pareto superior14 consent. 
Usually, the bargain posed by efficiency contractarians goes like 
this: 
Contractarians: 
We have here a proposal for an efficient rule that enriches investment 
bankers at the expense of widows and orphans. Between you people, 
none of you now knows who will be the investment banker and who will 
be the widow. We do know that we can have a regime with no winners 
or losers, but it will be poorer overall. The average share of such a soci-
ety has a low discounted value at this time. On the other hand, if you 
are willing to take some risks, then your share of the good things in life 
has more present value. 
Abstracted Persons: 
We are risk-neutral wealth maximizers. We are willing to risk a loss in 
the hope of achieving even greater wealth. We have no knowledge 
whether we'll be the widow who is disfavored, or the investment banker 
who reaps all the gains. 15 The efficient rule, however, increases the value 
of our chances for the good life. Therefore, we consent to the rule that 
favors investment bankers over widows. 
Such arguments, I think, are ineffective. One cannot really fathom a 
time when people are so disembodied from their histories that they 
have no idea whether they are more likely to be investment bankers or 
widows. It can hardly be denied that most people's fates are substan-
tially determined at the moment they are born. Therefore, the ex post 
losers in the above example need not always be persuaded that it is a 
13. A redistribution of resources is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if and only if under the redistri· 
bution the winners win enough so that they could compensate the losers. The notion of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not require that the winners actually compensate the losers. In 
effect, a redistribution is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if and only if it is a "possible" Pareto supe-
rior redistribution. 
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to 
Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 239 (1980). 
14. "A change is said to be Pareto superior if it makes at least one person better off and no 
one worse off. Such a change by definition increases the total amount of (human) happiness in 
the world." R. POSNER, THE EcONOMlCS OF JUSTICE 54 (1981). 
15. They do know 'they are adult humans, which fixes the game with regard to such difficult 
issues as abortion (i.e., they know they won't be aborted fetuses) and the superiority of average 
utility standards over total utility standards. See Hare, supra note 12, at 99-101. 
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good thing that investment bankers win at their expense.16 Such argu-
ments depend for their validity upon how attractive a portrait con-
tractarians draw of the abstracted individual. 
I therefore come to Jackson's scholarship with a great deal of skep-
ticism that contractarian fictions can breach the enormous gap be-
tween Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks economics. But beyond challenging 
the persuasiveness of the technique, I have two other complaints about 
the way Jackson practices his contractarianism. First, in pursuit of 
efficiency, Jackson uses the model ineptly. His models don't show 
what he claims they do. Second, Jackson, without warning, maintains 
the facade of contractarianism while dropping utilitarianism as the ba-
sic normative goal. The switch from utilitarianism to a "justice as 
fairness" view suggests to me that Jackson's jurisprudence is ad hoc 
and inconsistent, having as its only end (a) the legitimation of 
whatever the legal status quo happens to be, and (b) the maintenance 
of a deceptively calm contractarian surface. 
My critique of the efficiency version of his contractarianism will 
center on his allegation that all or most creditors would bargain to get 
equal priority in bankruptcy. My critique of his nonefficiency con-
tractarianism will focus on Jackson's explanation of bankruptcy dis-
charges. Each justification is based on radically different theories of 
the human personality, a change that Jackson fails to justify or even to 
make explicit. 
A. Creditor Priorities 
A central claim of Jackson's book is that all creditors would agree 
to equal priority in bankruptcy. This is the so-called "creditor's bar-
gain."17 The logical steps to this conclusion are as follows: (a) 
Nonbankruptcy law is the "state of nature" out of which the creditor's 
bargain emerges (pp. 4, 8). (b) The essence of nonbankruptcy debtor-
creditor law is "first in time, first in right,"18 a concept that preexists 
creditor equality. (c) Creditor equality is in tum the essence of bank-
ruptcy (p. 15). (d) Creditors have a precisely equal perception of their 
chance of winning a priority collection in case the debtor becomes in-
solvent (pp. 15, 30-31). (e) Creditors care only about maximizing their 
recovery; they have no altruism about their fellow creditors and no 
16. See J. RA.WIS, supra note 8, at 171 ("We must not be enticed by mathematically attrac-
tive assumptions into pretending that the contingencies of men's social positions and asymme-
tries of their situations somehow even out in the end. Rather, we must choose our conception of 
justice fully recognizing that this is not and cannot be the case."). 
17. The phrase is introduced in Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the 
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982). 
18. Pp. 8-9 ("It is like buying tickets for a popular rock event or opera: the people first in 
line get the best seats; those at the end of the line may get nothing at all."). Query whether this 
metaphor describes either state debtor-creditor Jaw or allocating seats to the opera. In my experi-
ence, the people with the best seats would never dream of standing in line for them. 
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particular animus toward them either. (f) If the creditors act to-
gether, they can gain, either by (i) capturing the "going concern" 
value of an enterprise, or at least by (ii) reducing the administrative 
cost of recovering from the debtor. 
Unfortunately, each and every assumption in Jackson's model is 
open to challenge. As a result, this model proves nothing about the 
institution of creditor equality in bankruptcy. In fact, even on his 
assumptions, Jackson does not prove that equality is the only agree-
ment the creditors could possibly reach. Not only would these credi-
tors agree to bankruptcy equality, but they would agree to bankruptcy 
inequality as well, if Jackson asked them to. 
Let's go over Jackson's logical steps one by one. I think we'll find 
almost no step along the way that is valid. In addition, we'll see that 
the model itself is a failure, because the conclusion is a non sequitur in 
relation to the premises of the model. 
1. Essences and Exceptions 
In attempting to show that the status quo is fueled by rational nor-
mative principles, Jackson must, of course, describe what he takes the 
status quo to be. According to Jackson, the essence of state debtor-
creditor law is a race of creditors to grab what they can. In contrast, 
the essence of federal bankruptcy law forces creditors to be treated 
equally. If Jackson has wrongly identified these essences, his work has 
been severely disabled, since these claims of competing essences fuel a 
gigantic portion of the book. The following paragraphs will argue that 
Jackson has no good justification for his essentialism. 
a. The essence of state law. State (or nonbankruptcy) law does 
give rise to a race among creditors to obtain judicial liens, of course, 
but it also contains norms of creditor equality. These equality norms 
are found in state receiverships and assignments for the benefit of cred-
itors. Because receiverships and assignments for the benefit of credi-
tors exist in state law along with the creditor race, Jackson cannot rely 
on the content of state law as the source of essence. On what basis, 
then, can Jackson say that the creditor race is the essence of state 
debtor-creditor law while creditor equality is the exception? 
One possible method of supporting this statement would be an em-
pirical study counting up the number of times creditors pursue insol-
vent debtors with judicial liens and how many times they pursue 
debtors under state-law regimes of creditor equality. This is not done 
in Jackson's book. Indeed, Jackson simply assumes the essence of 
state law is self-evident. Let's stipulate that state courts today see rela-
tively few receiverships or assignments for the benefit of creditors. 
This was not necessarily true throughout the nineteenth century, 
before Congress established the current federal bankruptcy regime, 
when business insolvencies were especially likely to be the subject of 
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state-created collective proceedings. Certainly in the nineteenth cen-
tury it might have been possible to claim that neither creditor equality 
nor creditor races predominated in state debtor-creditor law. 
If "first in time" is the essence of state debtor-creditor law, it is 
only a twentieth-century essence. This development is itself surely the 
product of federal bankruptcy law. That is, once Congress enacted a 
federal bankruptcy law,19 the use of creditor equality systems in state 
law became subject to competition from the federal system. This does 
not necessarily mean that state legislatures no longer cared about or 
would oppose creditor equality. It does say something about the com-
parative advantages of federal or state forums, but this conclusion is a 
far cry from arguing that creditors would contract out of "bad" state 
law in favor of "good" federal law. 
These comments are designed to show that the norm of "first in 
time, first in right" cannot necessarily be essentialized on the strength 
of historical claims. But a further point must be made against using 
history to justify Jackson's essentialism. In the absence of a bank-
ruptcy, surely the most common practice of creditors is to walk away 
from a claim and forget about it. 20 If we are going to assign "es-
sences" on the basis of practice rather than the content of state law, 
the essence of state debtor-creditor law will be no law at all, an essence 
in which creditors find themselves treated equally. 
b. The essence of bankruptcy. Not only is Jackson's account of the 
essence of state debtor-creditor law open to challenge, but his account 
of bankruptcy's essence is also dubious. Jackson claims that the es-
sence of bankruptcy is creditor equality. This claim is not borne out 
by examining the content of the bankruptcy statute, which contains all 
sorts of creditor priorities,21 nor is it borne out by empirical investiga-
tion. Bankruptcy statistics show that the vast majority of dollars pro-
duced by bankruptcy trustees go to administrative expenses and 
priority creditors.22 On the basis of practice, the numbers strongly 
suggest that creditor inequality is the essence of bankruptcy. 
The posture that Jackson takes toward the essence of bankruptcy is 
that state law (defined as the creditor race) is bad, and that creditors 
would gladly agree among themselves to do away with it. Bankruptcy 
equality is good, however, because it is consistent with the contract the 
creditors would have made among themselves if it had been conve-
nient to do so. It seems more than fair to ask, however, why Jackson 
19. Assuming for the moment that creditor equality is the essence offederal bankruptcy law, 
which is also open to dispute. See text at notes 21-22 infra. 
20. See Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 97, 102 (1984) ("Most businesses fail without a bankruptcy petition ever being filed."). 
21. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a), 726(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
22. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATIS· 
TICS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1977, at tables F.5 and F.6. 
1348 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1341 
should treat federal bankruptcy law as the distillation of pure reason 
and state law as some sort of autochthonous phenomenon that is al-
ways "prior" to creditor equality. If indeed state creditor races are 
bad, then where did the state law come from? If the object of debtor-
creditor law is to give the creditors what they want, then why did state 
law end up the way it did?23 These are not questions that Jackson 
addresses in his book. 
The fact that state law already contains norms of communitarian 
sharing implies that Jackson has presented a false choice to the hypo-
thetical creditors in his bargaining model. As state-law creditors, they 
already can force each other to share. Their consent to a communitar-
ian federal bankruptcy proceeding is therefore unrelated to maximiz-
ing profits by capturing the enhanced value of the estate in 
bankruptcy. Federalization of state debtor-creditor law has to be justi-
fied by principles that are closer to the logic of diversity jurisdiction 
than to the logic of profit maximization. 24 
To summarize, Jackson claims that he can decode the essences of 
state and federal debtor-creditor law, but he doesn't say where these 
essences come from. If they simply emanate from the text of statutes, 
then Jackson's claims are flatly contradicted by the presence of credi-
tor equality in state law and creditor priorities in federal law. If they 
come from observation of historic behavior, Jackson's claims seem 
poorly supported. The false assertion of the essences of law is not a 
minor flaw. Throughout his book, Jackson simply assumes that the 
values present in state law (creditor race) are prior to the values in 
bankruptcy law, and that bankruptcy law can only be justified in the 
context of state law. 
2. Equally Powerful Creditors 
In order for Jackson's contractarianjustification of creditor equal-
ity to work, it is necessary for Jackson's abstract creditors to be equal 
to all other creditors in their ability to collect. Therefore, at the core 
of Jackson's model is the notion that creditors are already deemed to 
be equal. Equal creditors are then shown to agree upon equality. 
Isn't this smuggling the rabbit into the hat?25 It shouldn't take any 
empirical study to convince you that creditors are not equal in their 
23. The answer, of course, is that state law did pursue the norm of creditor equality and that 
Jackson's identification of the essence of state law is false. 
24. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 105-06 (1982) (suggesting that a national Bankruptcy 
Act was a response to parochialism in state debtor-creditor law). 
25. By adopting the assumptions he does, Jackson runs afoul of the following excellent tip: 
"[T]he [contractarian] philosopher wants to start from weak, uncontroversial assumptions to 
secure the widest possible agreement in the philosophical community. If he begins with contro-
versial assumptions, he may be accused of arbitrariness or simply begging the question." Pence, 
supra note 10, at 138. 
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ability to collect. Historic creditors differ in their leverage and knowl-
edge, their skill in obtaining payment or liens, and their opportunity 
costs of litigating. Profit maximizing creditors who are powerful vis-a-
vis other creditors would not agree to give up power to weaklings un-
less they were compensated for it. Creditors who are weak would love 
to take power from stronger creditors, if they could. Whether there's 
a bargain to be made here is entirely an empirical proposition. If more 
credit volume comes from creditors who are weak than from creditors 
who are strong, the debtor may be able to buy off the strong creditors' 
consent with higher interest financed by the savings in interest that the 
debtor will obtain from the weak creditors, but this is not the ex ante 
bargain between equal creditors that Jackson imagines. It is a model 
based upon information asymmetries between inherently unequal 
creditors.26 
Jackson acknowledges that his readers might challenge his as-
sumption that, outside of bankruptcy, creditors are equal. Jackson 
writes: 
These assumptions may not matter to the actual conclusion. Because of 
the "race,'' many of the special advantages one creditor holds may be 
worthless. Participation in or monitoring the race will be costly for all 
creditors. In any event there will be residual elements of uncertainty of 
relative rankings that could be eliminated to the benefit of all creditors. 
Finally, there would be distinct advantages to a legal rule that presumed 
equality in the position of all creditors with similar legal entitlements, 
instead of delving into a case-by-case examination of factors, such as 
"knowledge" or "friendliness." [p. 15 n.18] 
In this passage, Jackson is simply stating that a creditor may feel ad-
vantaged under state law, but that the creditor may be wrong, in 
which case the creditor should prefer the equal priority in bankruptcy. 
This response could not be more lame. Jackson cannot dismiss posi-
tional advantages simply on the ground that the positional advantages 
"may" not exist. They do exist in nature,27 and his suggestion that 
creditors "may" be deceived does not serve to convince us that all 
creditors are equal in their power over the debtor. The whole premise 
26. Curiously, such a model would more closely resemble one Jackson developed to explain 
the efficiency of secured credit. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities 
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979). It may be asked why the asymmetries assumed in 
that article have been forgotten in Jackson's subsequent book. 
27. See Eisenberg, The Undersecured Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 
38 VAND. L. REV. 931, 960-62 (1985) (questioning whether general creditors are completely 
equal in their power attributes). 
Elsewhere, Jackson makes much of the fact that we can never judge the rationality of others. 
Pp. 242-43. But here, in order to save his model, Jackson judges creditors to be irrational if they 
believe themselves advantaged under state law. 
Jackson uses his "maybe they're wrong" tactic to explain why unperfected security interests 
should be void in bankruptcy. According to Jackson, it seems to unperfected, secured parties as 
though they have a better position under state law than do general creditors, but maybe they're 
wrong/ In any case, argues Jackson, it is too expensive to look into it, so destroying the un-
perfected security interest is advisable. Pp. 72-74. 
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of the objection Jackson must deal with is that positional advantage 
under state law is not worthless. 2s 
The other parts of the quoted passage are equally unsatisfactory. 
The observation that the creditor race is "costly" is completely irrele-
vant. Rights are always "costly" to enforce, but if an investment in 
enforcement promises a gigantic return, mere costliness will not per-
suade a creditor to give up profitable rights. All gains come at the 
expense of some investment. You can't plead the fact that investment 
requires capital in support of the view that investors would prefer not 
to invest. 
Similarly, when Jackson suggests that "there would be distinct ad-
vantages" in simply assuming that all creditors are equal, he forgets 
that he is trying to convince us that creditors would consent to equal 
bankruptcy priorities. There are "distinct advantages" only to those 
people who need to believe that Jackson's contract model is in any 
sense true. For those of us who feel no such need, and who expect 
Jackson to convince us that bankruptcy equality is Pareto superior to 
state law, I see no "distinct advantage" at all in assuming that all cred-
itors in real life are precisely equal in their power over the debtor. 
Quite the contrary. A rule that ignores the differences of creditors has 
the distinct disadvantage of producing the very false impression that 
Jackson's contractarian model has a modicum of validity. 
The above argument is the best Jackson can do to defend the claim 
that all creditors are equal undf?r state law, but it's a pretty sad tactic. 
Jackson may deserve some credit for at least recognizing that his argu-
ment has an enormous, gaping hole in it, but the words he throws into 
the breach are nonsensical. He has not even come close to saving his 
argument from the empirical weakness upon which it rests. 
3. Equals Agreeing Upon Equality 
Ironically, even though it is natural to assume that a priori equal 
creditors agree to be equal, it turns out that not even this pitiful thesis 
is justified under the assumptions Jackson gives us! In fact, depending 
on what question they are asked, equal creditors might also agree on 
unequal priorities. Furthermore, unequal creditors can be made to 
consent to equal priorities. 
Jackson's mode of obtaining hypothetical consent involves going 
back to a time when state law existed and bankruptcy did not. Jack-
son then sits down with two representative creditors and conducts the 
following conversation: 
28. Yet another logical flaw in this rehabilitating strategy might be mentioned. If a creditor 
feels strong under a "first in time" regime but is deceived, then how did the other fellow obtain 
his strength? The answer must be that he also obtained it through reliance on state remedies. If 
so, how do we know the creditor who feels powerful is the one deceived about state law, and not 
the other competing creditor? 
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Jackson: 
Listen, you two guys are completely equal in your ability to collect at 
state law and you care only about maximizing your collection. You'll be 
better off in a bankruptcy with equal priority, because then you two can 
split the increased value of the estate that the collective proceeding pro-
duces. So how about it? Do you consent to be equal in bankruptcy? 
Creditors: 
We consent. We get more in bankruptcy than out of it. 
What could be more rational than such a conversation? Rational 
though it may be, the possibility of such a conversation does not dis-
prove alternative conversations. An infinite number of other conversa-
tions are equally plausible. For example: 
Jackson: 
The equal priority deal is off. I've just decided I don't like Creditor A's 
face. And just to spite him, I now offer you the following deal. There's a 
bankruptcy gain (say, $20,000) to be divided here. I propose to give 
Creditor A what Creditor A would have gotten under a race priority 
(discounted by the risk that A might lose the race). In addition, we'll 
give Creditor A $10 of the $20,000 gain. Because I like Creditor B bet-
ter, he'll get the rest. And by the way, I've just noticed that you have to 
take state law or whatever bankruptcy proposal I choose to make. In 
that case, I think I'll help myself to $5,000 from the kitty as a little 
commission for myself. But only if you creditors agree, of course! 
Creditor B: 
Hey! Sounds great. I accept. I'm much better off in bankruptcy than 
under state law. 
Creditor A: 
Well, I'm better off by $10 in bankruptcy than under state law. I care 
only for profits and do not feel the sting of insult. I accept too! 
In the second conversation, the creditors have agreed to unequal bank-
ruptcy priorities (and a little pourboire for Tom Jackson himself). 
Yet on the premises of the creditors' bargain, they had to agree. The 
"consent" that Jackson has found is purely a product of the fact that 
the creditors must take a low-level state law entitlement or whatever 
bankruptcy entitlement Jackson chooses to propose. Under these 
premises, so long as each profit-maximizing creditor makes a gain in 
bankruptcy, Jackson could win consent from the creditors to a variety 
of propositions. All that is required to produce creditor consent is 
that each creditor get more from bankruptcy than from state law. 
The reason that Jackson's contract model is so indeterminate is 
that Jackson has erroneously connected the existence of bankruptcy 
efficiencies with the institution of creditor equality. The two have no 
logical connection whatsoever. They are non sequiturs.29 Stipulating 
29. That entitlements are non sequiturs to the maximization of a joint venture was a central 
insight of Coase. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 387, 396 (1981). 
Jackson himself recognizes (for other purposes) that there is no connection between priority 
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the existence of a wealth gain does not prove that profit-maximizing 
creditors must as a consequence agree to divide up the gain equally. 
In fact, with Jackson in charge of permitting legislation onto the floor, 
equal or unequal creditors will agree on any distribution that gives 
them more than they would have received under state law.30 
There is a way that Jackson might have rehabilitated his hypotheti-
cal consent. He might have proceeded as follows: 
Jackson: 
All right. We've got a $20,000 gain here if we can agree on a federal 
bankruptcy system. I'm not even going to suggest how to divide it up. 
You creditors will have to fight it out. 
Creditors: 
Ifwe had different bargaining skills, we might divide up the surplus in an 
unequal way, but since we are equal in all ways, including in bargaining 
skills, we hereby agree to divide the spoils equally.31 
Notice that my rehabilitation of the creditor's bargain does not 
force the creditors to choose between inefficient "first in time" priori-
ties and whatever bankruptcy rule Jackson dreams up. It simply as-
sumes that the creditors have the bankruptcy surplus as an entitlement 
(i.e., that priority is logically unrelated to the existence of the surplus). 
The creditors can propose among themselves a variety of rules. 
The above rehabilitation would have been an empty victory, how-
ever, if Jackson had thought to undertake it. It has the flaw of reintro-
ducing the need for creditors to be equal in order to agree among 
themselves to be equal. If creditors do not feel equal, there is no guar-
antee that equality would emerge from such a pot-splitting session. 
Creditors who would do better under state law will simply veto any 
proposal that does not recognize the value of their state law 
entitlements. 
4. Profit Maximization and the Ideology of Equality 
The creditor's bargain assumes (a) that creditors have equal power 
under state law, and (b) that creditors desire to maximize profits (to 
the exclusion of all other human desire). This latter assumption is 
and joint maximizing behavior. In a boring and very condescending metaphor about overfishing 
a lake, Jackson sees that you can give one fisherman the lion's share without threatening sound 
husbandry principles. Pp. S8-S9. Cf. In re Findley, 76 Bankr. S47, SS! (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1987) 
(catfish in Mississippi thrive even though encumbered by a lien). And he argues that giving 
secured parties more entitlements in bankruptcy will not deter a bankruptcy court from captur-
ing the going-concern value of a business enterprise. Pp. 181-90. It must also follow that giving 
unsecured creditors unequal priorities also has no relation to going-concern value. This is not a 
contradiction Jackson manages to acknowledge, however. 
30. See generally R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRI-
TIQUE OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE 43-4S (1977) (making a similar criticism of Rawls). 
31. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 198-99 (1977) (when distribution ofa 
surplus is unrelated to its production, equals agreeing to equality becomes plausible); R. WOLFF, 
supra note 30, at 32 (two players in a zero-sum game could rationally decide to be equal under 
the "maximin" principle). 
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very unreal, 32 but it serves an important purpose. It gives the impres-
sion that creditor equality is the product of self-interest. Without it, 
Jackson would have to argue that even equally powerful creditors 
favor equality only when they view each other as moral equals. If he 
were compelled to admit this, the creditor's bargain would be exposed 
as a complete tautology: creditors want equality because creditors 
want equality. 
Profit maximization (among equals) therefore displaces all other 
forms of ideology and allows the illusion that the norm of equality is 
produced by self-interest. But this illusion is the product of extremely 
unrealistic assumptions about human nature. Not only are real-life 
creditors unequal in power, but they certainly do not care only about 
maximizing profit. 33 
The addition of other conflicting ideologies may produce a "credi-
tor's bargain" for inequality. For instance, suppose that the creditors 
are workers who face major displacement costs, separate from their 
claims for back wages, because their employer has gone bankrupt. 
Such creditors {and other sympathetic creditors) might feel that these 
displacement costs, which cannot be recovered in bankruptcy, justify a 
high priority in bankruptcy for their back wages. 34 They may further 
feel that they have a moral claim to the means of production that out-
ranks the claims of debenture holders and financial institutions. 35 
These creditors might not agree to creditor equality and might insist 
on a bankruptcy priority for wage claims. 36 
Attributing a desire for profit maximization to (hypothetically 
equal) creditors seems indistinguishable from attributing to real credi-
tors a taste for equality. In either case, deriving norms of equality 
32. Profit maximizing is a much discredited assumption within the neoclassical theory of the 
firm. Today, economists would say that firms seek a mix ofleisure, prestige, self-fulfillment, and 
comfort, to mention a few loss leaders. See M. BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF EcONOMICS 
175-87 (1980). 
33. For an excellent treatment of self-interest and its relation to other normative beliefs, see 
Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 1309 (1986). Harrison writes: 
But now that we have discovered the opportunity to divide the surplus, we must also agree 
on what constitutes an equitable division. We bring to this problem our own subjective 
notions of equity. Even if we do not use any bargaining strategy and cooperate fully in our 
attempts to find a division that is fair, we may not succeed in agreeing on what constitutes a 
fair division. 
Id. at 1332-33 (footnote omitted). In this passage, Harrison implies that an equal division of a 
surplus might depend heavily on a pre-existing belief in the rightness of equality. 
34. Cf In re Continental Airlines Corp., 64 Bankr. 862, 863 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1986) (Civil 
Aeronautics Board refused to approve merger unless dislocated employees received cash awards 
for moving expenses). 
35. E.g., In re Continental Airlines Corp., 64 Bankr. 858 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1986) (wage 
earners make unsuccessful claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because employer 
filed for bankruptcy). 
36. And indeed they get priority for wage claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(4) (1982 & Supp. 
III 1985). 
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from the tastes and desires of people in society lays bare a psychologi-
cal assumption implicit in contractarian theory. Contractarianism is 
based upon a deep pessimism about whether the theorist can justify to 
himself or others what is good or bad in this world. This pessimism 
often leads the theorist to acquiesce to whatever other people want. In 
its utilitarian phase, such pessimism could lead to acquiescence in 
moral monstrosities, if other people want moral monstrosities (and 
they sometimes do). The truth of the matter is that efficiency-based 
contractarians like Jackson aren't utilitarians at all. Rather, they are 
conservatives who like the status quo and (in this status quo and none 
other) find the language of utilitarianism a fancy way for them to 
sound neutral and scientific. In the antebellum south or in nineteenth-
century London, I suspect that conservatives used utilitarian dogma to 
support some very nasty public policy,37 but since conservatives today 
have radically different preferences than conservatives in those eras, 
they would quickly reject legitimate utilitarian arguments made in 
such societies. For conservatives who apologize for the status quo 
with utilitarian arguments, deference to the wants and desires of 
others is not really the point at all. Rather, non-neutral admiration for 
the dominant beliefs already present in society is the point.38 
5. Enhanced Value of the Bankrupt Estate 
Suppose Jackson is right in claiming that all creditors are equal in 
collecting power and are greedy to the exclusion of all other human 
attributes. Jackson's contractarian justification of equal priorities in 
bankruptcy still requires a belief that communitarian bankruptcy en-
hances the value of the debtor's property while selfish state-law sys-
tems do not. 
If such an assumption is valid, it is true by definition that equally 
powerful creditors as a whole would prefer to share equally in a larger 
pie than to share equally in a lesser pie. This is merely the same as 
saying that creditors prefer the bigger pie over the smaller pie. Or, 
dividing each side of the formula by pie, big is big compared to small. 
Even this modest conclusion presupposes one of two facts: either 
(a) bankruptcy produces more value from assets than do state enforce-
ment systems, or (b) bankruptcy law saves more enforcement costs 
than nonbankruptcy law (pp. 14-17). These factual assertions are not 
self-evident. 39 It is possible to imagine systems in which the sheriff has 
37. Bentham, for example, had no trouble justifying slavery by the principles of utilitarian· 
ism. R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 34. 
38. Thus, Posner chickens out and comments, "The fact that much racial discrimination 
may be efficient does not mean that it is or should be lawful." R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 363. 
39. Indeed, throughout most of the book, Jackson rails against non-neutral incentives. It 
turns out these incentives are bad because they might lead to inefficient bankruptcies. See text 
accompanying notes 116-17 infra. Even Jackson, from time to time, does not believe that the 
efficiency of bankruptcy is self-evident. 
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the motive to maximize the sales price, as where her poundage fee is 
directly related to the sales price. After all, how is the bankruptcy 
trustee's motive any different? Her fee too is based upon maximizing 
the sales price. 40 
In fact, Jackson identifies only one kind of value enhancement in 
bankruptcy: the capture of going-concern value. I find this confusing, 
since bankruptcy liquidations do not depend on capturing going-con-
cern value. For cases in which going-concern value is absent, Jackson 
gives no clue as to why or whether bankruptcy liquidations can en-
hance the value of the estate better than state-law liquidation systems. 
In any case, we don't inevitably need a bankruptcy system to capture 
going-concern value. State receiverships could do the same.41 
The allegation that state law produces more enforcement costs 
than bankruptcy is also not proven. One can imagine all sorts of extra 
legal costs in bankruptcy that might not exist in state law. Junior 
creditors, for example, have an incentive to expend legal fees in chal-
lenging valuations of collateral in bankruptcy, or in getting their 
trustee to challenge voidable preferences. These costs might be re-
duced or eliminated under state law, where the secured party simply 
holds a sale. 
This is a good place to invoke the Coase Theorem, which holds 
that the background legal regime does not matter; profit maximizing 
people will maneuver to maximize profit whether in or out of bank-
ruptcy.42 Jackson presents no clear picture of why state law inevitably 
sacrifices going-concern value and bankruptcy does not. 
6. Summary 
Jackson's "creditors' bargain" is even less than a hollow tautology. 
It is based on a false picture oflegal doctrine. The bargain is the prod-
uct of creditors being totally equal in all aspects and completely apa-
thetic to status and prestige between themselves, a highly unbelievable 
portrait of historically situated human beings. Finally, the bargain for 
equality ends up being a non sequitur. Profit-maximizing creditors 
would agree to anything so long as they get more in bankruptcy than 
out of it. For these reasons, Jackson's contractarianism fails to justify 
the institution of federal bankruptcy.43 
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 326, 330 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
41. Chapter Seven liquidations routinely occur when there is no going-concern value. Per-
sonal bankruptcies are radically divorced from going concern value as well. 
42. Jackson is not completely unaware of the Coase Theorem. Elsewhere, in explaining the 
existence of going-concern value, he disposes of the Coase Theorem as follows: "Suffice it to say, 
for our purposes, that informational and transactional barriers are often sufficient to permit this 
discrepancy to exist." P. 14 n.17. Such a rationale seems dangerously close (let's face it, identi-
cal) to deducing the existence of transaction costs solely from the fact that reality does not match 
up to Jackson's theory. No law-and-econmµics theory is ever wrong if such deductions are 
permitted. 
43. It might be fair to ask if I have any better suggestions than Jackson for attributing 
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B. Discharge of Debt 
1. From Individualist Efficiency to Inefficient Individualism 
Throughout most of the book, Jackson uses his contractarianism 
to show that bankruptcy law is efficient and that profit-maximizing 
creditors and debtors would have agreed to the rules if they had been 
consulted in advance. No one is hurt unless he or she has consented, 
and society is wealthier to boot. By cooking the facts, Jackson pro-
duces a happy confluence between individual sovereignty and utili-
tarian justifications for bankruptcy law. 
Contractarianism, however, is not itself a philosophy or ethical 
theory. Rather, it is merely a rhetorical device by which philosophers 
argue for other theories - theories presentable without appeals to hy-
pothetical consensus.44 By now, it should be apparent that Jackson is 
able to make the claim of unanimous consent only by using an ex-
"meaning" to the equal priority in bankruptcy. I do. My interpretation does not go to the 
phenomenon of federal bankruptcy, but rather to the idea of creditor equality in any kind of 
collective proceeding. 
My own view is that creditor equality could be viewed as a chapter in the general move from 
status to contract. Creditor equality might help to further the move in diminishing the impor-
tance of "status" relations between particular creditors and particular debtors. The race of dili-
gent creditors promotes the interests of those vested with power over and information in the 
debtor, because knowledgeable or influential creditors are more likely to win the race. Worseley 
v. DeMatteos, 96 Eng. Rep. 1160, 116S (K.B. 17S8) ("Suppose, just before, and in contemplation 
of an intended bankruptcy, such a deed, of all of his effects, was made, and possession instantly 
delivered [to pay the debts of favourites] this ..• must be unjust, if not corrupt."). Creditor 
equality breaks down this "status" relationship and encourages purely abstract creditor entities 
to compete for collection even without the sunk costs in pre-existent power. Rosenfeld, Affirma-
tive Action, Justice, and Equalities: A Philosophical and Constitutional Appraisal, 46 Omo ST. 
L.J. 84S, 8S2 (198S) [hereinafter Rosenfeld, Equalities] ("Moreover, by placing the postulate of 
equality within its proper historical perspective, one is reminded that it first emerged as a moral 
weapon against the privileges of status and birth characteristic of the feudal order."); see also 
Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 
MINN. L. R.Ev. 207, 213-30 (1986) (developing a theory on the anonymizing norms in commer-
cial law); Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of Liens on After-Acquired Property, 6 CARDOZO L. 
R.Ev. SOS, Sl9-20 (198S) (arguing that creditor diligence is descriptive, not normative); Weisberg, 
Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 
STAN. L. R.Ev. 3, 98 (1986) (bankruptcy equality favors distant creditors over local creditors). 
These comments suggest that a creditor's "job" is not to maximize recovery through a non-
consensual grab. Rather, the creditor is expected to share when the debtor is insolvent in a sort 
of anti-feudal gesture toward a market ideology. See Weisberg, supra, at 88 ("when instead 
American bankruptcy law aggressively took on the spirit of equality as equity, the suppressed 
moral questions about bankruptcy shifted to the creditor's collegial duty to uphold this rather 
abstract collectivist spirit"). Bankruptcy, then, becomes the primary (but not the only) institu-
tion designed to force creditors to share with other creditors. It is a communitarian, rather than 
a self-interested, regime. It tells the creditor that he is going to share equally with his fellows 
whether he likes it or not. 
I do not mean to suggest that law has immanent rationalities, or that anonymization of credi· 
tor rights is per se desirable. See Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 
UCLA L. R.Ev. 403, 446-48 (1973) (finding moral worth in status relations). I only wish to 
suggest that equal priority may be a normative idea put in place to confirm desired creditor 
conduct, rather than the product of what creditors really want separate from law. It is too late in 
legal scholarship for anyone to suggest seriously that human desire is always prior to and deter-
minative of the law. Law is just as likely to inform human preference as vice versa. 
44. See Dworkin, supra note 7, at 19, 37. 
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tremely unrealistic and ahistoric caricature of creditors. Given that 
fact, Jackson might as well have made his utilitarian claim straight off 
(although, as we have seen, even that claim is pretty dubious). If he 
had followed this advice, he could have limited his efforts to showing 
that a majority of people (or people with a majority of the utility) 
would prefer equal priorities in bankruptcy.45 
At least where externalities are not produced,46 efficiency implies 
that subgroups unhappy with the efficient law could contract for their 
own maximizing rule.47 But when the parties are not permitted to 
change a bankruptcy rule by contract, efficiency cannot easily explain 
the rule without abandoning a faith in the sovereign individual. 
Debtors in bankruptcy have a more or less unwaivable right to a 
bankruptcy discharge.48 That is, consumers who do not prefer to pre-
serve discharge rights are nevertheless prevented from contracting 
them away. Accordingly, Jackson must abandon efficiency - at least 
of the na1ve "sovereign consumer" sort - as the norm that justifies 
bankruptcy discharges. Instead, Jackson uses what he calls a "Rawl-
sian" mode of justification (pp. 236-37). 
The shift from efficiency claims to Rawlsian claims is totally unjus-
tified in Jackson's book. Why should creditor priorities have a utilita-
rian basis, while bankruptcy discharge must have a basis in neo-
Kantian transcendentalism? A competent philosopher is supposed to 
develop consistent systems. 
The reason that Jackson reverts to unacknowledged ad hoc shifts 
in ethical theories, I suspect, is to preserve the illusion that he has 
discovered a single deep structure of bankruptcy in contractarianism. 
That is, the language of hypothetical contract can always be used for 
efficiency arguments and it can also be used by Rawlsians to establish 
the transcendental quality of an ethical proposition. This common vo-
cabulary is supposed to lull us into thinking that Jackson has revealed 
an important discovery of something embedded within the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 
If it is correct that contractarianism is not itself an ethical theory, 
Jackson substitutes word play for real philosophy. Because the vocab-
ulary of contract in fact masks radically different ethical systems that 
contradict each other, we might briefly review some of the ways 
45. Id. at 43 (veto power of individuals inconsistent with utilitarian theory). 
46. Assuming there are ever such moments. Given the facts that (a) we take an intense 
interest in what our neighbors are thinking and feeling, and that such feelings must count in a 
utilitarian model with integrity, and that (b) any given contract affects the ability of the parties to 
make other contracts elsewhere, thereby shifting the demand curves any offeror faces, it may be 
that externalities are always present when two parties contract. 
47. Creditors in bankruptcy do in fact have the opportunity to contract out of equal priority. 
See Carlson, A Theory of Contractual Debt Subordination and Lien Priority, 38 VAND. L. REv. 
975 (1985). 
48. The limited scope of the debtor's power to waive bankruptcy discharge is described in 11 
U.S.C. § 524 (a)(l) (1982). 
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Rawls' liberal individualism in A Theory of Justice contrasts with 
utilitarianism. 
First, utilitarianism is majoritarian and hence communitarian in 
nature. It seeks to maximize aggregate human happiness by consul-
ting the wants and needs of actual individuals, thereby mimicking lib-
eral philosophy in this regard. But once a policy has been approved on 
utilitarian grounds, the minority that loses is expected to sacrifice itself 
for the good of the majority. It is just this illiberal (communitarian) 
feature of utilitarianism that Rawls is trying to avoid. In searching 
for universal principles, Rawls insists that the hypothetical consent be 
completely unanimous. A majority vote will not do!49 This is no im-
pediment, however. Since contractarians simply dream up the ab-
stract human attributes needed to produce a unanimous agreement to 
a given proposition, it should be an easy matter to rig any model to 
produce unanimity by acclamation. so 
Rawls freely admits that his model will always yield unanimously 
consenting individuals.51 This brings us to a second important differ-
ence between utilitarian and Rawlsian contractarianism. Utilitarians 
pretend to be neutral about what to do; they then go out into the 
world and, on the basis of empirical research, discover whether a given 
program increases aggregate happiness in the world. Rawls, in con-
trast, is no determinist. He already knows exactly what programs he 
prefers - essentially, the war-on-poverty-style welfare state that was 
still popular in the early 1970s. He then undertakes to find the philos-
ophy that universalizes these preconceived intuitions. 52 
49. See J. RAwrs, supra note 8, at 11-12; Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice, supra note 5, at 
868. 
50. See Countryman, supra note 1, at 827. 
When Jackson's chapters on bankruptcy discharge first appeared as an article in the Harvard 
Law Review, Jackson thought he was making a Rawlsian argument if he could show "that most 
people would choose to retain a nonwaivable right of discharge if they knew of the psychological 
factors that tempt them to overconsume credit." Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy 
Law, 98 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1393, 1394 (1985) (emphasis added). Admirably, Jackson, in his book, 
is merely ambiguous on whether unanimity is important or not. The only place where he con-
cedes that nonunanimity could exist is a place where he seems to slide (without warning us) into 
an efficiency argument. P. 241. Therefore, it is possible (although somehow I doubt it) that 
Jackson understands the significance of unanimity in Rawlsian arguments. 
51. J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 139-40; see Pence, supra note 10, at 147 ("since there is no 
possibility of conflicts of interest, there is no possibility of non-unanimity"). For the view that 
the veil of ignorance was not even necessary to produce unanimity of agreement (in light of the 
presupposed equality of the bargainers), see Nagel, Rawls on Justice, 82 PHIL. REV. 220, 225 
(1973). 
52. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at viii ("Of the traditional views, it is [contractarian-
ism], I believe, which best approximates our considered judgments of justice and constitutes the 
most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society."), id. at 4 (wishes to see if intuitive no-
tions of individualism can be accounted for), id. at 141 ("We want to define the original position 
so that we get the desired solution."), id. at 166 ("one of the main problems of justice as fairness 
[is] to define the original position in such a way that, while a meaningful agreement can be 
reached ... the constraints imposed ... still lead to principles characteristic of the contractarian 
tradition"). See Hare, supra note 12, at 83-84 (describing Rawls as an intuitionist); Stick, Can 
Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 377 (1986) ("For Rawls and Dworkin, moral 
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This is not to say that Rawls' philosophy is useless or unsuccessful. 
Rawls argues that the contractarian model has a role to play within an 
intuitionist system whereby we are led to question our views within 
the context of a reflective equilibrium. 53 Robert Paul Wolff points out 
that the assumptions introduced by Rawls in hypothesizing unani-
mous consent successfully describe what it means for a person to take 
the "moral position." That is, the "moral position" requires that we 
pretend to be ignorant of the contingent facts of our situation in life. 54 
Rawls' technique is to discover what kind of human being it would 
take to agree unanimously about the fundamental institutions underly-
ing his own predispositions. If the resulting portrait of essential 
human qualities is attractive, Rawls knows that his beliefs have been 
justified on universally applicable principles. 55 If not attractive, Rawls 
knows that his preferences are in "reflective disequilibrium. "56 
intuitions come first, theories are then built to explain a group of intuitions we feel strongly 
about, with the grand theory checked against other intuitions."). 
53. See Dworkin, supra note 7, at 27-37 (criticizing the usefulness of contractarianism for 
this purpose). 
To the extent Rawls explores his own preconceived intuitions in a state of reflective equilib-
rium, use of words such as "universalize" has to be taken in a specialized sense. Rawls, of 
course, never reaches universals in the sense of asserting them as true in all times and contexts. 
If he did, there would be no need for reflective equilibrium between potential universals and 
preconceived intuitions. Rawls has made such thoughts explicit in a recent article. Rawls, Jus-
tice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 223 (1985). 
54. R. WOLFF, supra note 30, 61-64. Wolff presents a rather detailed history of why Rawls is 
so free to admit the dependence of his philosophy upon the preferred outcome. According to 
Wolff, Rawls, in 1958, had presented a contractarian theorem without the "veil of ignorance." 
Critics then hammered away at Rawls, pointing out that people of different talents would not 
necessarily come to bargains even on the basic principles posed by Rawls. Thereafter, Rawls 
dedicated his career to the rehabilitation of his 1958 article. Thus, Rawls abandoned the idea 
that the hypothetical contract "explained" the institutions of society. Instead, he simply 
presented the assumptions of the hypothetical bargaining session needed to produce the result he 
sought-reaffirmation of the basic institutions in a liberal welfare state. Id. at 3-4, 57-65. Wolff 
comments somewhat slyly: 
Now, it is perfectly sensible to treat a set of words [such as Rawls' 1958 article] in this 
manner if they come to us with some stamp of authority - if, for example, they are the 
words of God. When reason conflicts with the apparent meaning of God's commands, one 
natural (although not the only) response is to interpret the command. One cannot simply 
change it, since it is God's word, but one can cast about for a meaning conformable to 
reason and moral intuition. The same sort of procedure makes some sense when one is 
dealing with the writings of a great but obscure thinker. Some philosophers on occasion 
have deep insights that are rich in suggestion and promise, but whose expression is obscure 
or confused .... But there is something slightly odd about a philosopher treating his own 
words in this manner. Surely, we want to say, Rawls should either decide that his original 
solution to the bargaining game was correct, and defend it, or else decide that it was wrong, 
and change it. But why decide that it was wrong, and then split the difference by sticking 
with the words and changing their meaning? 
Id. at 878-79. 
55. See Yablon, supra note 9, at 878-79. 
56. Jackson, in contrast, does not explicitly state that he openly embraces a system whereby 
he first identifies his own personal prejudices and then works backward to find the universal 
principles that justify them. Nevertheless, given the fact that the basic bankruptcy status quo 
almost always escapes unscathed in Jackson's book, Jackson does seem to be in the Rawlsian 
tradition of cooking the results of his thought experiments (albeit not consciously). 
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Rawls' desire to discover universal principles leads to a third dis-
tinction between utilitarianism and Rawlsian contractarianism. Utili-
tarians love tiny, historically situated problems. Indeed, they cannot 
deal with anything else. What individuals want is a function of their 
wealth; any proposal to change a metainstitution would also change 
what individuals want, thereby leading to a serious indeterminacy.57 
In contrast, Rawls specifically limits his contractarianism to the justifi-
cation of only the most basic institutions - such as the political equal-
ity or economic inequality of the individual. Such a limitation is 
necessary in order to render Rawls' abstracted, unanimously con-
senting humans still plausible to us.58 Rawls believes that, as ethical 
propositions become more and more contingent on the facts of society, 
"second best" fairness arguments can be effective tools of justification 
that will break down the likelihood of unanimous consent.59 Rawls 
has been sharply criticized for keeping his theory insulated from 
knock-about microeconomic issues in which our moral intuitions are 
likely to be the strongest. 60 But Rawls' abstractness is virtually dic-
tated by the fact that in ethics, as elsewhere, two wrongs often do 
make a right. 61 
The above observation should suggest that in justifying a tiny little 
institution like the bankruptcy discharge Jackson cannot invoke the 
prestige of John Rawls to protect his argument. In a universe detailed 
enough to have creditors, debtors, and bankruptcies, human beings 
already have so much historicity attributed to them that unanimous 
agreement about bankruptcy discharges can only be achieved by pro-
ducing a distorted and unrealistic portrait of human nature. 62 
Rawls' ahistoricism leads to a fourth distinction between utili-
tarian and Rawlsian contractarianism. Utilitarians constantly invite 
individuals to calculate preferences between present and future con-
57. On wealth effects as a pervasive source of indeterminacy in law-and-economics, see Ken-
nedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981). 
Kennedy is attacked in Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determina-
tion of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1169 (1984); and defended in Carlson, Reforming 
the Efficiency Criterion: Comments on Some Recent Suggestions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 39, 52-58 
(1986). 
58. See Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice, supra note 5, at 817. 
59. See J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 57. Mark Tushnet put it very well: 
Moral philosophy, in its present state, can only rely on objective values that are so abstract 
that they cannot provide nonnative guidance in real cases. A theory of justice in a world 
with serious imperfections is undeveloped in the literature and might help. I would bet, 
however, that a philosopher's theory of the second best would establish that moral philoso-
phy alone must remain insufficient. 
Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1213 (1980). 
60. R. NOZICK, supra note 31, at 204-06 (1974). Nozick errs, however, in supposing that 
Rawls dismisses micro issues as "unimportant," id. at 206-07, and fails to see that Rawls worries 
about valid second-best concerns in microethical issues. 
61. See J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 57. 
62. In the next section, we'll see that Jackson does produce an abstract portrait of a con-
senting human being that is indeed unrealistic. 
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sumption. Rawls bars any probabilistic knowledge from the original 
position. 63 Instead, his unanimously consenting persons assume con-
servatively that they should approve political proposals on the as-
sumption that each will be dealt the absolute worst position in society 
when the veil of ignorance is lifted. 64 The abolition of probabilistic 
knowledge seems vitally necessary to distinguish Rawlsian contractari-
anism from utilitarianism. If people knew the odds of winning and 
losing, they might well vote to "take a chance" and would end up 
approving any proposal that produced an efficiency gain. 65 
A fifth distinction between utilitarianism and Rawlsian con-
tractarianism is that utilitarianism accounts for altruistic preferences 
in the world. 66 Rawls, on the other hand, attempts to base unanimous 
consent on the self-interested individual.67 Here, at least, Jackson 
adopts a genuine Rawlsian trait. He too seems interested in basing 
hypothetical consent on self-interest. 68 
For at least these five reasons, Jackson needs to justify why utili-
tarian contractarianism is used in part of his book and abandoned in 
the chapters on bankruptcy discharges. His failure to explain this 
switch in ethical theories renders his philosophizing about bankruptcy 
ad hoc. 
2. Jackson's Theory of Personality 
Jackson bases both his utilitarian contractarianism and his Rawl-
63. J. RA.WIS, supra note 8, at 155. 
64. Id. at 152-53. 
65. R.M. Hare accuses Rawls of hiding in lofty abstractions because otherwise Rawls' con-
tractarianism leads directly to utilitarianism. Hare writes: 
We can, indeed, easily sympathize with the predicament of one who, having been working 
for the best part of his career on the construction of "a viable alternative to the utilitarian 
tradition," discovered that the type of theory he embraced, in its simplest and most natural 
form, led directly to a kind of utilitarianism. 
Hare, supra note 12, at 91 (citation omitted). 
66. I say this with full knowledge that most economics is practiced on the strength of the 
profit-maximizing assumption. This assumption badly distorts genuine utilitarian calculations. 
See generally Harrison, supra note 33. 
67. J. RA.WIS, supra note 8, at 183-92. 
68. At one point, Jackson states that he is interested in producing a systematic theory of 
bankruptcy discharges. He does not define what makes a theory systematic. He does, however, 
criticize Anthony Kronman for being nonsystematic in revealing a competing truth embedded in 
bankruptcy discharges. See pp. 233-34. Kronman has deduced that bankruptcy discharges pre-
vent people from feeling regret, see Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE 
L.J. 763 (1983), a theory that presupposes altruistic feelings toward others. I think (but I'm not 
sure) that Jackson views altruism as an insufficiently stable basis for explaining bankruptcy dis-
charges (in comparison to self-interest). Therefore, I take "systematic" to mean "always present 
in the human personality" and a "systematic theory" to be one that shows that people prefer 
bankruptcy discharges based on self-protection. See p. 233 ("Rather, in order to justify 
nonwaivability, it must be shown that individuals systematically misjudge (or ignore) their own 
interests and that this bias consistently leads them in one direction - to consume too much and 
save too little."); p. 241 ("The preceding discussion suggests that what seems initially to be a 
paternalistic justification for discharge may in fact be consistent with society's preference for 
individual autonomy."). 
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sian contractarianism on an abstract person bent on maximizing her 
self-interest. But, as we have seen, utilitarianism and Rawlsian con-
tractarianism are radically contradictory ethical theories. Within his 
discussion of self-interest, Jackson engages in a major shift in his the-
ory of personality. In the creditor-priority model, Jackson's human 
beings were completely rational calculators. Human beings in his 
chapter on bankruptcy discharges suddenly become more complex 
(although equally as unbelievable). They modulate between cupidity, 
stupidity, and lucidity in a most unpredictable manner. Jackson com-
pletely fails to explain why (or even notice that) people have different 
attributes in different parts of the book. 
Even putting aside this enormous inconsistency, Jackson's theory 
of the personality that prefers bankruptcy discharge is most uncon-
vincing. Jackson starts off by promising to expose a universal human 
trait that renders the bankruptcy discharge desirable to all people69 
(although he ends up not delivering). He identifies two departures 
from the rational calculator that supposedly justify equal priority in 
bankruptcy: (1) the impulsive, noncalculating desire to go on a buying 
binge, 70 and (2) incomplete information about the future. Careful 
reading of Jackson's book will reveal that Jackson does not intend 
these to be universal traits, however. It turns out that only some of us 
suffer from these traits, so that there is no "systematic" human failure 
after all. 71 I don't think Jackson is close to making his case for these 
predicates, in either the universal or nonuniversal versions. Further-
more, we will see that Jackson's insincerity about his bounded theory 
of personality - his unwillingness to assert that we all are congenital 
binge buyers or bad prognosticators - causes Jackson, right in the 
middle of his so-called Rawlsian argument, to modulate between lib-
eral individualism and utilitarianism. 
a. Impulse buying. Jackson claims that some (all?) people have 
"impulse" personalities. Jackson is not completely insensitive to the 
charge that what we call a person's "impulse" the person might call 
her own "rational" preference for present consumption over future 
consumption (pp. 242-43). After all, throughout most of Jackson's 
book, the consumer is sovereign and is entitled to his autonomy as 
both a prudential and ethical matter. 72 
69. The problem cannot be simply that people come to regret some of their actions because 
they or their circumstances have changed over time. Rather, in order to justify 
nonwaivability, it must be shown that individuals systematically misjudge (or ignore) their 
own interests and that this bias •.. leads them to consume too much and save too little. 
P. 233 (emphasis in original). 
70. "When presented with a choice, individuals tend to choose current over postponed grati-
fication, even if it is known that the latter holds in store a greater measure of benefits." P. 234. 
71. Although Jackson is quite vague on whether impulse behavior is universal in human 
beings, numerous passages are designed to deal with the problem that not everyone suffers from 
impulse buying. See pp. 236, 241-43. 
72. Autonomy is prudential, Jackson thinks, in that we do not have the technology to tell the 
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The difference between the sovereign consumer and the impulsive 
individual is defined by the impulsive person himself, according to 
Jackson. The impulsive person wants protection against the impulse 
and hence wants the bankruptcy discharge. 73 The discharge (Jackson 
claims) has the effect of making credit unavailable today, thereby re-
moving a person from danger.74 Thus, anyone who wants the bank-
ruptcy discharge for himself shows himself to be an impulse buyer. 
Indeed, this declaration is, apparently, the only evidence available to 
distinguish rational from irrational behavior. 75 
That some people want bankruptcy discharges for themselves does 
not answer (and is not intended to answer) why we all must take or 
not take the discharge as a group. Why should the great majority 
suffer the "loss" of credit opportunities because a few addictive per-
sonalities will abuse the privilege? Jackson's response is to fall back on 
Rawls: 
This kind of rule is justified by [a] hypothesized Rawlsian original posi-
tion ... : if the members of society had gathered together before the fact 
and had anticipated the human tendency toward impulsive behavior, 
difference between rational calculation and impulsive behavior. Only the individual can tell us 
that, says Jackson. Pp. 242-44. Autonomy is also stated to be an a priori good at various points 
as well. P. 240-41 ("Framing the problem this way allows us to see how a system premised on 
individual autonomy can accommodate certain socially imposed restrictions on activity that are 
commonly deemed paternalistic."). See also Jackson, supra note 50, at 1404 ("much of Ameri-
can society in general[ ] is structured around the premise that individuals should for the most 
part [note the fudge word] have the freedom to order their own affairs as they please"). 
Such concepts as "maximizing autonomy" (in the non-Kantian sense of freedom from depen-
dence on or interference from others) are usually dismissed as indeterminate or incoherent in that 
they do not have enough content to mediate between admittedly conflicting desires of different 
human beings. One particularly interesting essay is Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and 
Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1980). Kennedy and Michelman put forth the 
thesis that there is a law of conservation of security, whereby one person's "freedom" is ex-
panded only at the expense of shrinking someone else's. They would view the concept of "maxi-
mizing autonomy" (quite correctly, in my view) as a meaningless statement. 
None of these concerns bothers Jackson, however, who assumes that he has said something 
when he asserts that America loves autonomy. America loves brotherhood, patriotism, and 
prayers in school. These concepts don't have the slightest thing to do with personal autonomy 
and in fact are antithetical to it. 
73. If unrestrained individuals would generally choose to consume today rather than save 
for tomorrow, and if this tendency stems in part from impulse, they may, given the chance, 
opt for a way of removing or at least restricting that choice in advance. If individuals can-
not control the impulse themselves, they may want the assistance of a socially imposed rule, 
one that will simply enforce the hypothesized decisions of their fully rational selves. 
P. 235. 
74. "[The] tendency of individuals to impose external restraints on their impulses provides a 
basis for deciding which of an individual's personalities to favor .... The control of impulsive 
behavior, then, may provide a key insight on the road to justifying discharge policy." P. 235. 
Note the emphasis on the decision of the restrained individual as the basis of justification. Jack-
son wants to deny that bankruptcy discharges are paternalistic and wants to substitute a self-
paternalistic justification. 
75. "When society attempts to distinguish individuals who act impulsively ... from those 
who do not, it runs the grave risk of substituting an external social judgment for the subjective 
wants and needs of the individual." P. 242. 
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they would have devised a rule that denied them the opportunity to be-
have impulsively in the future. [pp. 236-37; emphasis added]. 
This leap from "some people want self-protection from their con-
tracts" to "we all want self-protection" is presumably based on Rawls, 
convention that, behind the veil of ignorance, each person does not 
know whether she will be dealt the defective binge-buying personal-
ity76 and must therefore bargain as if she will be the binge-buyer.77 
Please note that, in the original position, we would all agree that 
all contracts are ultimately nonbinding, 78 because we are systemati-
cally (or perhaps randomly) too impulsive to take responsibility for 
our future. This Rawlsian argument is a complete self-contradiction, 
unless Jackson abandons the claim that we each have an uncontrolla-
ble impulse within us. How can contract be the basis of society when 
human beings are systematically too incompetent to contract? In-
stead, the binge-buying impulse must be in the nature of learned be-
havior, or perhaps a disease. Othefwise, Jackson could not practice 
his contractarianism at all. 79 
Be that as it may, Jackson's argument that binge-buyers want the 
76. Cf. J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 137 ("no one knows ... the special features of his psychol-
ogy such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism"); id. at 172 ("[T]he parties 
do not know whether or not they have a characteristic aversion to taking chances."). Rawls 
would also insist that the folks in the original position be ignorant of the exact odds of being in 
one group or the other. Id. at 155. 
77. This is the so-called "maximin" bargaining strategy. J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 152-56. 
78. After all, bankruptcy discharge and freedom of contract are completely at war with each 
other. 
79. Jackson does attempt a possible strategy to rehabilitate the pervasiveness of binge-buying 
tendencies: Reason is to be disembodied from the impulsive personality, and it is possible in the 
original position to consult the disembodied reason (or noumenal self) separate from the rest of 
the personality (or phenomenal self). Jackson writes: 
This tendency of individuals to impose external restraints on their impulses provides a basis 
for deciding which of an individual's personalities to favor. One personality is the rational 
planner; it carefully assesses the relative merits of current versus future consumption •••• 
The impulse personality does not authentically choose because it does not rationally ponder 
how a given decision will affect the individual's long-term interests. 
P. 235. Cf. R. WOLFF, supra note 30, at 103-04 (interpreting Rawls to be attempting such a 
strategy). 
The problem with such a strategy is that Jackson is no longer consulting the preferences of 
human beings but is simply consulting (somebody's) principles of reason. Such a strategy aban-
dons neutrality about the good, and substitutes subjective notions about what is reasonable. 
One way to keep actual human personalities in the consent scheme (and thereby staying 
relatively neutral about what is good) is to characterize impulsive behavior as learned behavior, 
and not part of the human personality at all. That way, genuine human beings can be placed in 
the original position (before they pick up bad habits), instead of disembodied reason. 
But if impulsive behavior is learned and not genetic, it certainly suggests that people could 
"learn" to control their impulses. See p. 235 ("The rational self, to the contrary, suppresses the 
temptation to act impulsively ...• "). Once that is admitted, Jackson needs to explain why 
people in the original position would agree to repeal the discharge in order to encourage the 
rational self to control the irrational self. 
Rawls views self-paternalism as a principle that may be adopted from the original position: 
[O]nce the ideal conception is chosen, they will want to insure themselves against the possi-
bility that their powers are undeveloped and they cannot rationally advance their interests, 
as in the case of children .... It is also rational for them to protect themselves against their 
own irrational inclinations by consenting to a scheme of penalties that may give them a 
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discharge for themselves is also rendered confusing by his false as-
sumptions about the effect of the bankruptcy discharge. Jackson as-
sumes that the discharge will "control" the binge-buying impulse "by 
encouraging creditors to monitor borrowing."80 Here Jackson implies 
that creditors will withhold credit altogether as a result of monitoring. 
This does not follow for at least two reasons. First, Jackson's di-
chotomy between "rational" creditors and potentially irrational bor-
rowers is a false one. Why are all creditors rational, while all irrational 
people end up as debtors? Extending bad loans can be a form of binge-
buying, as any bank failure will demonstrate. In short, Jackson fails to 
account for the fact that perhaps creditors will make mistakes in con-
trolling debtors' credit habits. 
Second, Jackson is quite unrealistic in imagining that rational cred-
itors will withhold credit from binge-buyers. 81 Creditors may be un-
able to recognize the good borrowers from the binge-buying maniacs. 
They may choose to increase the cost of credit to everyone, collecting 
the lost principal from the interest charged to the "rational" buyers 
and the irrational-but-lucky bingers. Please recall that Jackson be-
lieves that we can never objectively tell whether a buyer rationally pre-
fers present over future consumption and that we depend upon the 
debtors themselves to tell us they are binge-buyers by declaring, "I 
want an unwaivable bankruptcy discharge and I want it for myself." 
If such declarations are the only way we can separate out rational from 
irrational behavior, then "monitoring" must consist of creditors ask-
ing prospective borrowers whether they are uncontrollable binge-buy-
sufficient motive to avoid foolish actions and by accepting certain impositions designed to 
undo the unfortunate consequences of their imprudent behavior. 
J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 248-49. Note that Rawls sees his system as indeterminate about 
issues like bankruptcy discharges. That is, he sees that it is reasonable to agree to repealing the 
discharge (in order to provide incentives to control the impulse) or instituting the discharge (to 
undo the unfortunate consequences of their folly). Jackson, on the other hand, certainly implies 
that bankruptcy discharge is the one and only rational response to the uncontrollable impulsive 
personality. 
80. P. 236. See also p. 249. "Controlling" the impulse itself must be distinguished from 
protecting the debtor from the long-term consequences of the uncontrolled impulse. Jackson 
clearly means that the discharge will render impulsive borrowers unable to borrow. 
81. It by no means follows that creditors will always feel that discharges interfere with their 
chances of recovering the principal of a loan. Suppose the borrower has wealth but no important 
job prospects. If the borrower goes bankrupt, he will have no wealth. The bankruptcy discharge 
would have little to do with the credit decision in this case, because the creditor can expect no 
garnishable income to be earned after bankruptcy. 
Another absurdity in Jackson's assumption is the clear implication that with the bankruptcy 
discharge the impulsive buyer is unable to borrow, but that without the discharge the rational 
creditor will gladly lend to a binge-buyer. If this is so, it must be because the lender knows he 
can always garnish future wages. 
There is a big logical hole in this assumption. Only a maximum of 25% of wages can be 
garnished in this country. See note 95 infra. If the binge-buyer continues his profligate ways, the 
future wages are constantly subject to garnishments from other "prudent" lenders. As a result, 
future wages are lousy collateral and not sufficient to justify a loan to the binge-buyer. Hence, 
lenders already have an incentive to monitor the debtor and do not need the bankruptcy dis-
charge to provide the incentive to do so. 
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ing maniacs. Now what do you suppose the typical binge-buyer is 
going to say (having already succumbed to the dark forces of unreason 
and asked for a loan)? I think it is fair to assume that at least some of 
the irrational binge-buyers are going to lie and say that they are not 
bingers at all. As a result, monitoring will fail to identify the bingers. 
They will be lumped in with everyone else. 82 That means everyone 
gets credit, but at a higher price. So long as credit remains available at 
a higher price, the discharge, if anything, worsens the short-term effect 
of the binge-buying impulse by driving the debtor into bankruptcy ear-
lier than if interest rates were lower. Therefore, it is wrong to premise 
the argument on discharge as "controlling" the impulse, unless Jack-
son is serious that the creditors will withdraw credit altogether. 
Rather, the discharge protects a person from long-term suffering be-
cause the impulse is in fact uncontrolled. 
Another thing that must be said about this alleged binge-buying 
impulse is that Jackson obviously views it as a type of insanity that 
cannot be controlled. That is, no type of incentive will cause the ra-
tional side of the personality to increase its strength against the irra-
tional side. This claim is central to Jackson's entire analysis; if 
punishments succeed in strengthening the resolve of the rational per-
sonality to squelch the irrational personality, then the bankruptcy dis-
charge is counterproductive. Carried to its extreme, Jackson's 
argument - that our impulses cannot be controlled - delegitimates 
all modem criminal law and tort theory, which rest fundamentally on 
the premise that people's behavior can be influenced by punishments. 
Jackson cannot simultaneously practice law-and-economics and 
also believe that the incentives produced by the law are worth nothing. 
Rather, he must view binge-buying as a "special" (i.e., nonsystematic) 
case, like the insanity defense in criminal law. Jackson implicitly ad-
mits this when he states that it is "too costly" to separate out the sane 
from the insane, and hence we are all presumed insane: 
A nonwaivable right of discharge may be desirable even if some individu-
als do not need its protection, as long as (1) a substantial number of 
people are likely to experience unanticipated regret as a result of impul-
sive behavior or unwitting reliance on incomplete heuristics and (2) it is 
either impossible or extremely expensive to distinguish those who will 
experience ... regret from those who will not. 83 
In the above quotation, Jackson has, without announcement, 
switched from a "Rawlsian" argument back to an efficiency argument. 
82. Although Jackson implies credit will be withheld altogether from binge-buyers, he as· 
sumes elsewhere that credit will still be available but at a higher price. See p. 246 ("To be sure, 
Creditor will pass at least some of the additional costs back to Debtor in the form of higher 
interest charges; to the extent that Creditor does so, Debtor will internalize the costs and there 
will be no externality."). I wish I had a dollar for every inconsistency in this book. 
83. P. 241. Presumably, with regard to crimes more serious than stiffing a creditor, it is no 
longer too costly to distinguish the sane from the insane. At least I hope so. 
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Jackson makes empirical assertions - large numbers of bingers and 
high costs of screening - that are quite irrelevant to Rawlsian justifi-
cation. The efficiency argument therefore depends on being able to 
distinguish binge-buying from rational behavior and on identifying the 
screening costs84 (which Jackson deduces must be high solely from the 
fact that the statute does not follow his theory). 85 
Now, if there are really uncontrollable spendthrifts out there, 
Jackson can go ahead and make his Rawlsian argument on their be-
half. But he cannot make his efficiency argument without adding in 
another important factor. One thing Jackson completely leaves out is 
that the discharge itself transforms binge-buying from irrational to ra-
tional behavior. Or to put it another way, the discharge itself might in 
fact encourage the very behavior that Jackson supposes the discharge 
squelches. 86 Surely the diseconomies of strategic binge-buying in an-
ticipation of bankruptcy must be added to Jackson's cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Here Jackson faces a serious circularity problem. Are people 
binge-buyers and hence there's a discharge, or are people binge-buyers 
because there's a discharge? In fact, it is impossible to determine 
whether law is a product of human desire or whether human desire is 
a product of law. Once civilized, it is impossible to imagine what we 
would want if we had no civilization, because our desires are formed 
by civilization. 
To summarize, Jackson attempts to isolate a phenomenon of un-
controllable impulsive behavior and then connect it to the existence of 
the bankruptcy discharge. The attempt, however, is completely 
botched. His method of isolating those with a propensity to binge 
from rational calculators depends entirely upon self-identification. 
84. Here, Jackson claims it is too costly and intrusive to distinguish the rational from the 
irrational borrowers and that it is cheaper to give everyone the discharge and presume everyone 
irrational. See pp. 241-42. But elsewhere Jackson presumes creditors can "monitor" debtors and 
foreclose the bingers from credit altogether. See p. 236. It sounds to me as if the creditors of 
page 236 ought to be put to work on the screening of pages 241-42! 
85. Jackson is very sly on proving that the alternative costs to bankruptcy discharge are 
really very high. In the end, he relies on the impossibility of knowing another person's utilities. 
"When society attempts to distinguish individuals who act impulsively or who rely on incomplete 
heuristics ... it runs the grave risk of substituting an external social judgment for the subjective 
wants and needs of the individual." P. 242. This observation is supposed to convince us that, 
since the cost of telling the difference between those who need paternalism and those who don't is 
too high, it is better to have untrammeled paternalism for everyone. But if substituting our 
ideology for a debtor's own choice is an evil, then why have a bankruptcy discharge at all? Why 
not have no paternalism instead of universal paternalism? 
Readers should not be fooled by this kind of sloganeering. Jackson set out to prove the costs 
of screening to be higher than the attribution of mental defects to specific individuals. He did not 
do so, rendering his efficiency argument totally unsubstantiated. Deducing high costs from the 
existence of the very law you are trying to explain is circular. 
86. Jackson does recognize this at other parts of his book, whenever he writes about the 
incentives that non-neutral bankruptcy rules create. See text at notes 116-38 infra. He fails to 
see that this belief in incentives undermines his discovery that preventing impulsive behavior is 
the goal of bankruptcy discharge. 
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Yet the mode of self-identification - wanting the discharge for protec-
tion against impulse - is said to be a universal Rawlsian desire. This 
universal desire to destroy freedom of contract defeats Jackson's con-
tractarianism generally and his justification of the discharge in partic-
u1ar. Finally, his explanation of discharges ignores the possibility that 
people can be influenced by the incentives of the law and that binge-
buying might itself be a strategic reaction to the existence of the 
discharge. 
b. Incomplete heuristics. In addition to binge-buying, Jackson 
also offers up a second flaw in the human personality - incomplete 
heuristics - that justifies the bankruptcy discharge. As with impul-
sive behavior, Jackson is evasive on whether this flaw is systematically 
present in human beings. 
There are at least two versions of what "incomplete heuristics" 
could mean. First, it could mean that, holding constant the quantity 
of information relevant to future predictions, some people calculate 
well and some people calcu1ate badly. This, of course, assumes the 
existence of an objective arithmetic of predicting the future, against 
which we can assess individual calculations. The existence of such an 
objective arithmetic violates the premises of classical liberalism: that 
only each individual can decide what is good for herself. According to 
the second version, "incomplete heuristics" could mean that it is im-
possible or too expensive to gather all the facts all the time, so that our 
calculations are inevitably bounded by budgetary concerns. This lat-
ter version seems more defensible, but, judging from the type of evi-
dence Jackson marshals (individuals are generally too dumb to do 
probability calculations), he seems to have the former in mind. 
Whatever Jackson's theory of incomplete heuristics is, it seems to 
stem from two anecdotes told by psychologists. These anecdotes are 
supposed to prove that all (some?) human beings are too incompetent 
to manage their futures when the facts are held constant. One anec-
dote is about picking poker chips out of one of two bags. One bag has 
mostly blue chips and one has mostly red chips. Of twelve samples, 
eight are red chips. People are then asked what are the odds that the 
chips came from the predominantly red bag. Most people, it turns 
out, choose seventy percent or eighty percent, but the real odds (on the 
numbers given) turn out to be ninety-seven percent.87 The other ex-
ample is the assertion that people don't realize that when a plan in-
volves ten steps, each of which is, say, ninety percent successful, the 
plan has less than a thirty-five percent probability of being successful. 
Rather, they assume that success is almost certain to follow, because 
87. P. 237 n.35. ·The example comes from Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information 
Processing, in FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 17, 20-21 (B. Kleinmuntz ed. 
1968). 
April-May 1987] Philosophy in Bankruptcy 1369 
each step has a high probability of being successful. 88 
Now I will concede that if you give the public pop quizzes in statis-
tics, untrained individuals will make mistakes and will not give the 
answers that the statisticians want. But can we deduce from this gen-
eral statistical nai'.vete that each and every person in the world is likely 
to overmortgage the future? Statistical expertise is a learnable skill. It 
is possible to teach people how to pass pop quizzes (or so undergradu-
ate professors assume). This kind of knowledge has nothing to do 
with the innate, genetic flaw in the human psyche that Jackson claims 
exists. 89 I don't know beans about the odds of picking blue or red 
poker chips out of a sack, but I am pretty confident that I can live 
within my means. These two threadbare little anecdotes about statisti-
cal ignorance in no sense prove that some or all people are too incom-
petent to plan their lives.9o 
Now even if it were true that "most people" cannot rationally fig-
ure out how to match future income and future outflow, there are sev-
eral other obstacles between this fact and the successful justification of 
the bankruptcy discharge. Since the Bankruptcy Code includes no 
distinction between good and bad calculators, Jackson must at a mini-
mum show that bad calculators end up in bankruptcy more often than 
good calculators (for the mere fact of rational risk implies some ra-
tional failures). How can we distinguish between good and bad calcu-
lation?91 All we know is that (a) the credit transaction took place, and 
(b) repayment did or did not occur. These data do not prove whether 
the borrower calculated correctly or miscalculated. A person who re-
paid might have miscalculated and still have been lucky. A person 
who defaulted might have calculated correctly and been unlucky.92 
88. P. 239 n.40 (citing Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under: Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1129 (1974)). 
89. This point was inspired by some remarks made by Phillip Shuchman at a bankruptcy 
conference at Duke University, held on April 12, 1986. 
90. See Tillers, Mapping Inferential Domains, 66 B.U. L. REv. 883, 932 (1986) ("We have 
things backwards if we say that we should devise models of rational inference and then try to 
make our inferential processes conform to them. The object of a theory of inference is to eluci-
date the logical properties of inferential techniques that actually work."). Jackson himself begs 
the question of whether the two little anecdotes prove his thesis. He writes that "[al]though none 
of this work directly addresses the risks of nonpayment in credit decisions, these hypotheses 
suggest that individuals will underestimate the risks inherent in repayment. Nonetheless, it 
would be useful to have this theory tested empirically by examining the effect of heuristic biases 
on credit decisions." P. 239 n.40. One would have thought that a "major" work published by 
the Harvard University Press would be just the place to develop the data necessary to ground 
bankruptcy law in the biological makeup of man. However, developing data bases is hard work. 
Making up hypothetical contracts is not. See generally Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, The Use 
of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, SO LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 219 
(1987) (examining difficulties legal academics face in gathering empirical data). 
91. Since Jackson goes on at length about bad heuristics, I am supposing that he believes 
there is such a thing as good heuristics. This possibility must not be the same as "good result" 
since irrational perception of the risk presupposes that good calculators will sometimes be fail-
ures and bad calculators will sometimes be successes. 
92. See A. D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
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Therefore, Jackson has given us a theory of bankruptcy behavior that 
is completely unverifiable. 
Jackson's assumption that he can tell the difference between good 
and bad heuristics should be contrasted to his earlier pessimism about 
his ability to tell the difference between rational calculation and impul-
sive behavior. This pessimism caused Jackson to rely heavily on an 
individual's reportage that he favored the discharge for himself. If 
Jackson needs this manifestation to tell the difference.between calcula-
tion and no calculation, how is it that he can tell the difference be-
tween bad and good calculation? I think the answer is that he can't 
and that this section of his book is a hopeless muddle.93 
3. Noncontractarian Justifications of Bankruptcy Discharge: 
Externalities and "Welfare" Economics 
In the above discussion, I have argued that Jackson, without warn-
ing or justification, switches from utilitarianism to individualism (and 
back). Similarly, he changes his theory of the human personality, at-
tributing to debtors motives that are totally different from the desire 
for profit maximization that creditors had. The ad hoc flavor of this 
reasoning is enough to cause us to reject it. 
Jackson has two other "explanations" of the bankruptcy discharge 
that I cannot resist commenting on. One is based on bad economics 
and the other is based on even worse sociology. The economic claim is 
that the bankruptcy discharge prevents externalities. The sociological 
claim is that the bankruptcy discharge might help relieve the welfare 
rolls of deadbeat debtors (a claim that Jackson tentatively rejects after 
lengthy commentary). 
a. Externalities. Putting aside a somewhat underdeveloped page 
about the need to protect love and friendship,94 Jackson's theory of 
LAW 22 (1984) ("a prediction expressed in terms of probability cannot be invalidated by the 
event that actually occurs"). . 
93. Furthermore, what does it mean for an individual to calculate the odds of his future? 
There is no logarithmic table that tells you such data as, "There's a 13.8% chance you'll lose 
your job." That's just a lot of hooey that economists use to grease their mathematic models. In 
real life, this alleged calculation of the future seems to be no more than simply a feeling of 
confidence that is in no way quantifiable. The so-called calculation may not cause the credit 
transaction. The transaction may simply be driven by nonrational affects. The calculating con-
sciousness that is (occasionally) experienced may be merely epiphenomena). See A. D'AMATO, 
supra note 92, at 23 ("no matter how refined it is, on any given day a prediction of eighty percent 
rain for tomorrow is still only a measure of the degree of confidence of the predictor and cannot 
be invalidated by the fact that the next day the weather is sunny."). See also IA J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 37.6, at 1054-61 (P. Tillers ed. 1983) (describing Bayesianism in this vein). 
I do not mean to say that all predictions are qualitatively equal. I simply wish to challenge 
the easy assumption that there is an exact calculus of historical prediction expressible as percent-
age chances. These numbers only express the strength of feelings in a very imprecise way. 
94. See pp. 243-44. Briefly, Jackson worries about family and friends who rely on the debtor 
for psychological as well as financial support. Without discharges for the debtor, these people 
could suffer losses. 
As to financial support, Jackson must have only nonobligatory gifts in mind, since legally 
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externalities produced by the bankruptcy discharge goes like this: (a) 
Even with garnishment protection, workers at the margin will quit 
their jobs if twenty-five percent of their wages95 is garnished for the 
foreseeable future. (b) Workers usually produce a surplus beyond 
their wages, which belongs to the employers.96 (c) This surplus guar-
antees that the public cost of garnishment (the cause of quitting) ex-
ceeds the private cost to the debtor. 
There is something very wrong with this account. Why does Jack-
son assume that workers in debt will obviously quit their jobs? A lot 
of workers might take second jobs to keep up with their debts. And 
even if they do quit, where does this employer's surplus come from? 
Usually, it comes from competition on the wage front.97 If there is no 
competition, there may be no surplus, because the worker is a monop-
olist who will have extracted the surplus for herself. On the other 
hand, if there is wage competition between workers, there is no loss of 
binding family support is ultimately a nondischargeable claim. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & 
Supp. III 1985). Any theory of inefficient gift-giving, however, must explain why distributions to 
relatives and friends produce more utility than distributions to creditors would. See generally 
Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. (forthcoming). It might 
be possible to do so, however, on "efficient income redistribution" grounds. See, e.g., Markovits, 
The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misal/ocation: A Checklist for Micro-
Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. l, 4-5 (1975) (emphasizing that people have dimin-
ishing utility for marginal dollars). 
As for psychological support, Jackson does not even begin to make his case. We all like to 
think that our friends will stick by us when we fall into debt, but there are a million aphorisms to 
the effect that friends tend to melt away when a person loses her wealth. But let's be generous 
and assume that friendship is a product that survives impoverishment and that friends really do 
suffer pain when the debtor does not obtain a discharge. The discharge does not preserve the 
debtor's wealth, of course. It eliminates debt which might otherwise be collected from future 
wages or future wealth. If friends feel pain, it must be unrelated to the loss of wealth (which is 
inevitable) and dependent upon the debtor's inability to accumulate wealth thereafter. If, how-
ever, friendship has survived present impoverishment, would it not survive future impoverish-
ment also? 
Let me add something else. Speaking only for myself, if a friend of mine went bankrupt, 
skipped out on his debts, and then took a lucrative garnishment-free job thereafter, my pain 
would not be dissipated. Quite the contrary. It would be the very source of pain. Skipping out of 
one's debts is ignoble in my book, while suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous misfortune 
is ennobling. Discharges can cause pain in some friends. In any case, if loss of friendship is a 
real concern, I doubt that Jackson is being very insightful when he states that friends and rela-
tives can protect their interests by "negotiating" with a debtor over whether he should take credit 
risks. P. 243. Isn't this the same binge-buying debtor with bad heuristics referred to earlier in 
the book? 
95. Federal law limits all wage garnishments to a maximum of 25% of wages, or 60% if the 
creditor has an alimony or child support claim. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). Since these latter 
claims are not dischargeable in bankruptcy anyway, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 
1985), we can simply refer to the 25% rule as relevant in the present discussion. 
96. P. 245 ("collection actions will still produce negative externalities if the individual's 
wages prior to his substitution of leisure systematically underestimated the marginal value of his 
productive efforts") (emphasis in original). 
97. It might also come from long-term employment contracts in which wage rates are locked 
in, where an employee with monopoly power guessed wrongly about the amount of surplus there 
would be for extraction. Unions, of course, aim at establishing and exploiting bargaining power 
and might similarly misestimate the amount of surplus, but, if the employer can replace a quit-
ting union member with another just as good, no loss occurs in a union context either. 
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surplus as Jackson supposes, because the employer will simply go out 
and hire someone else.98 
Jackson's argument about social loss is quite incomprehensible, but 
it is so much fun that I think we should look it over rather carefully. 
Jackson writes: 
Consider the case of a law professor. Assume that all law professors are 
suited equally to either teaching or practice and that the prevailing wage 
rates are set at a level that will attract the necessary number of law 
professors. . . . Assuming the prevailing salary of law professors to be 
$75,000 a year and that of practicing lawyers to be $150,000, the law 
professor at the margin will be enjoying $75,000 of non pecuniary benefits 
from his job. Because of the assumption of full substitutability of law 
professors for lawyers, the social benefit of the two jobs will be equal, 
notwithstanding the wage differential. But because wages can be reached 
by creditors whereas the other job benefit[s] cannot, a law professor 
faced with a lifetime of wage garnishment might switch to a job with a 
lower wage level but similar amounts of leisure and nonpecuniary bene-
fits. Even though the lower absolute level of entitlements (wages plus 
leisure and nonpecuniary benefits) reflects a socially less productive job, 
the switch would be less costly to the law professor than it would be to 
society. [pp. 246-47] 
Although the above analysis is truly rotten economics, it is anthropo-
logically fascinating. First, note that Jackson asks us to assume that 
professors earn $75,000 a year. Given such a salary, we can safely 
assume Jackson has a tenured professor in mind. It is well known that 
tenured law professors in America can and do whittle down their 
workload99 to "a few hours a week thirty weeks a year."100 The 
98. See Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests in Consumer Transactions, 7 
CARDOZO L. REv. 959, 969 & n.39 (1986). Even if Jackson is right that the surplus would 
inevitably be lost (which he's not), Jackson probably errs in calling the potential loss of surplus 
an "externality." P. 257. He definitely errs in supposing that higher interest rates charged by 
creditors in anticipation of the bankruptcy discharge will eliminate the "externality" of the 
worker imposing the "cost" of leisure on the creditor. P. 246 (leaving open the possibility that 
not all the externality is eliminated through higher interest). 
I take an external cost to be a part of the marginal cost of production that a producer can 
pass on to the public. Externalities therefore lower the marginal cost of the producer below the 
"optimum" level and cause overproduction of the product in question. 
Instead of describing garnishments as an externality, I would have said that the garnished 
worker is facing a cross-elasticity of supply between two potential products - work and leisure. 
The garnishment is a "tax" on work - not an externality resulting from leisure. The marginal 
tax pushes the worker toward nonoptimal leisure. 
Meanwhile - and here's where Jackson definitely gets it wrong - the strategic reaction of a 
creditor to this "tax avoidance" - higher interest up front - would not solve the disincentive to 
choose leisure over work. The higher interest is a sunk cost, from the worker's perspective, by 
the time the worker must decide between working and goofing off. It can have no influence on 
the garnished worker and can only compensate the creditor in advance for expected losses. 
Therefore, internalization through higher interest rates up front is totally irrelevant to Jackson's 
thesis. 
99. Jackson is careful to define "work" as that which a person must do to be paid. Leisure is 
"time spent on activities other than paying work." P. 247 n.59. 
100. Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132-34 (1980); see also 
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thought that a tenured professor would quit such a job is truly fantas-
tic. Many a dean wishes Jackson were right. 
But look at Jackson's assumption! A tenured professor who has 
25% of her wages garnished is going to switch to a new job with the 
same leisure and prestige and less wages? Where's the sense in that? 
For one thing, the new job will presumably be garnishable just like the 
old one. But even if it were not, what incentive does the professor 
have to take the dead loss that Jackson suggests? Putting aside a de-
sire to spite the creditor, it seems to me that the professor is much 
better off staying put than taking the same leisure and less money 
elsewhere. 
Finally, the thought that society suffers a deadweight loss because 
a tenured law professor quits is just laughable. The dean at the 
Harvard Law School needs to put Professor Jackson on the faculty 
appointments committee for a semester. I think Jackson would find it 
a revelation how many people are willing to fill a vacated professorship 
for a good deal less than $75,000. I don't see the social loss if some 
tenured professor heads for the hills. Quite the opposite. If repealing 
the bankruptcy discharge could get rid of overpaid, underproductive, 
tenured law professors, then, far from proving the rationality of the 
discharge, Jackson has made the strongest conceivable argument for 
getting rid of it! 
I don't think Jackson has shown that the social loss of an employee 
quitting his job is higher than the private loss to the employee. But 
even if this were so, 101 Jackson has once again forgotten the Coase 
Theorem, which says that, absent transaction costs, the affected par-
ties will simply bargain for an efficient solution. For instance, suppose 
there is monopoly power in the worker, such that if he quits his re-
placement would be an inferior worker. This could impose a loss on 
the employer. It also imposes a loss on the garnishing creditors. If 
transaction costs are low, the creditors, the debtor, and the employer 
could agree to split the difference, with the creditors taking less than 
their entitlement in exchange for agreeing not to garnish. The ineffi-
ciency caused by nondischargeable debt therefore does not depend at 
all on the existence of an employer surplus but is related to the trans-
action costs that must be incurred to keep a worker on the job.102 
b. Debtors on the dole. If Jackson's economic display fails badly, 
Swygert & Gozansky, The Desirability of Post-Tenure Performance Reviews of Law Professors, 15 
STETSON L. REV. 355 (1986). 
101. William Whitford suggests a more sensible social loss if workers can be garnished. 
Workers are likely to be fired and suffer a loss of personal esteem as a result. Whitford, supra 
note 98, at 969. What I like about this suggestion is that Whitford is willing to concede this 
possible loss even though it is theoretically illegal to fire workers just because they have been 
garnished. See 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982). That is, sometimes the law that people follow is not 
the law that is on the books. 
102. Jackson writes that his account "ignores such factors as the ability of Creditor and 
Debtor to agree to have only a portion of Debtor's wages garnished." Pp. 245-46. It sure does! 
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so does his suggestion that the discharge helps keep the welfare rolls 
clear. Admittedly, Jackson concludes (on inadequate reasoning) that 
this rationale is "incomplete." But Jackson gives it considerable 
credence: "If there were no right of discharge, an individual who lost 
his assets to creditors might rely instead on social welfare programs. 
The existence of those programs might induce him to underestimate 
the true costs of his decisions to borrow."103 
Such a thesis shows a fantastic ignorance of the American welfare 
system. In the United States, federally funded welfare programs are 
limited to the aged, blind, disabled, or single parents with dependent 
children.104 In addition, states sometimes provide categories of aid to 
which the federal government does not contribute, but these programs 
infrequently apply to able-bodied people who can work. 105 The Food 
Stamp program provides some means for debtors to receive public 
support, 106 but even the Food Stamp program has a work requirement 
for able-bodied people.107 Unemployment insurance requires that the 
bankrupt debtor contrive to get himself fired, but unemployment bene-
fits are very short term.108 In addition, the debtor must be prepared to 
work and is monitored constantly to make sure he is actively looking 
for work. It is safe to say, then, that the debtor who could work but 
refuses will find it hard to get welfare from the govemment.109 
If there is a connection between bankruptcy discharges and our 
welfare system, Jackson has not made the case. With our politics full 
Since Jackson sees at least one refutation of his extemality theory, one can wonder why he pro· 
ceeds to present the theory anyway. 
103. P. 231. In a truly heartbreaking passage, Jackson expresses his view that welfare en· 
courages mountain climbing. "A person who breaks his legs while mountain climbing may be 
entitled to unemployment benefits, food stamps, health care, and the like. The knowledge that 
such assistance is available invites the individual to discount • . • the costs of possible future 
injury when deciding whether to climb." P. 231. Does Jackson really suppose that our welfare 
rolls are populated by crippled mountain climbers, or any class of people that is remotely 
analogous? 
104. s. LAW, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR 18-33 (1974). Even with regard to AFDC, able· 
bodied adults must register for the Work Incentive Program, unless they cannot do so because of 
child-rearing concerns. A narrow set of excuses for not registering are set forth in 45 C.F.R. 
§ 224.20(b) (1986). The Reagan Administration has recently made it even harder for able-bodied 
parents to qualify for AFDC and has introduced "workfare" programs that force able-bodied 
welfare recipients to "earn" their welfare through uncompensated work. See S. LEVITAN, PRO· 
GRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR 37 (1985). 
105. Sylvia Law lists twenty-one states whose general relief programs are limited to the un· 
employable. S. LAW, supra note 104, at 67-68. In other states, recipients must show that they 
tried to find work and were unsuccessful. Id. at 68. The awards are usually grants to meet needs 
specified by the recipient. Id. 
106. See generally 7 C.F.R. § 271.l(a) (1987) (a purpose of the food stamp program is to 
enable low-income persons to obtain sufficient nutritious foods). 
107. Certain people are exempt from registering for work, such as parents who must take 
care of their children, people under 18 or over 65, students, etc. 7 C.F.R. § 273.7(b) (1987). 
108. Cf. S. LEVITAN, supra note 104, at 46-49. 
109. See Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 
1463-64 (1986). 
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of base canards and false assumptions about politically vulnerable wel-
fare recipients, it seems inexcusable that Jackson would float a major 
sociological theory about welfare without even lifting a finger to do 
some basic research on the question. In any case, it seems a fair as-
sumption that able-bodied workers who prefer to quit their jobs if gar-
nished will turn to the underground economy long before they apply 
to welfare. The path from the bankruptcy courts to the welfare rolls is 
one that needs to be established by sociological research that Jackson 
does not even conceive of in his book.110 
Jackson does end by concluding that keeping the welfare rolls free 
of deadbeats is not "the" explanation after all. But his refutation of 
his own straw-man argument is rather perplexing: 
If the reason for making bankruptcy's discharge nonwaivable is to 
lighten the burden on the public fisc by reducing reliance on safety-net 
programs, there are alternative means to achieve this goal that would 
restrict individual autonomy less than the existing discharge rules do. If 
discharge law were concerned only with furthering this narrow goal, it 
could simply allow the debtor, after bankruptcy, to shield from garnish-
ment a sum equal to the average weekly value of the safety-net benefits 
he would otherwise be entitled to. [p. 232] 
Note the weird logical steps Jackson makes in this quotation: (a) 
There is a single "reason" fueling the law that needs to be decoded. 
(b) This reason is the maximization of personal autonomy, a principle 
on which, as Jackson states elsewhere, "much of American society in 
general[] is structured."111 (c) It is a property oflaw's "reason" that it 
has been identified only when one can think of no alternative system 
that would "restrict individual autonomy less." (d) The debtor's au-
tonomy112 is maximized when the creditors are not allowed to garnish 
an amount of money set by some safety-net criterion. This would be 
accomplished by denying an able-bodied debtor welfare, so that the 
debtor would have to get a job. The debtor gets to keep just enough 
wages to equal his welfare entitlement. The rest of the wages goes to 
the creditors: Thus, since Jackson has thought of a less restrictive al-
ternative for keeping the welfare rolls clear, he supposes that he has 
110. If any kind of relation exists between bankruptcy discharge and welfare, it cannot be 
that able-bodied workers will collect welfare. Rather, it must be that the dependents of workers 
are abandoned and thrown into public welfare programs. Even so, major work must be done to 
show a relationship between declining wages and disintegrating families. Tossing off a few 
paragraphs alleging even this relationship (which Jackson does not do) would still be irresponsi-
ble scholarship, although it would be a clear advance over what Jackson suggests. 
Judge Prudence Abram has recently suggested to me another kind of connection. She be-
lieves that a number of people who lose their jobs use their credit cards to get by until they can 
find a new job. If they cannot find one, bankruptcy ensues. If Judge Abram is right, then bank-
ruptcy may be a kind of welfare system for the middle class and not a means of keeping the 
welfare rolls clear. 
111. Jackson, supra note 50, at 1404. 
112. Whether it is the debtor whose autonomy is enhanced is not exactly clear from the 
above passage. 
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defeated any causal relationship between bankruptcy discharges and 
welfare. 113 
Not many of these steps are comprehensible. Note in particular 
that Jackson assumes that coercing a person to substitute work for 
leisure will necessarily "maximize" autonomy, a rather startling con-
clusion.114 As usual, these assumptions are left totally undescribed 
and unjustified in the book.115 
113. The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982), already guaran· 
tees a person 75% of his wages, regardless of need. Therefore, his "least restrictive alternative" 
for keeping the welfare roles clear could be a much worse deal for a lot of debtors than the deal 
they get now under the FCCP A. 
114. Jackson's assertion that the debtor's autonomy is enhanced ifhe is forced to go out and 
work when he would rather goof off simply fuels my suspicion that the word "autonomy" is 
infinitely corrupt and malleable. Jackson's logic of "autonomy" goes like this: (a) autonomy is 
desirable; (b) it is desirable to force a deadbeat to do some work; (c) this program of coercion 
therefore enhances the deadbeat's autonomy. This sounds like totalitarian double-speak to mel 
Putting welfare bums to work is not the only Tory note that Jackson sounds. One of my 
favorites: "It should not defy anticipation, for example, that the student radical of twenty may 
become a business leader - or a born-again Christian - by forty." P. 234. 
115. Do I have any better suggestions about the meaning of bankruptcy discharges? I think 
so. An investigation of history suggests some rationalities that are far removed from self-pater-
nalism fueled by fear and pessimism. The historical record suggests that we divide bankruptcy 
discharges into two types: (a) the version in which creditors have a power to deny the debtor a 
discharge, and (b) the version in which qualifying debtors obtain a discharge even if all the 
creditors dissent. 
Initially, there were no bankruptcy discharges. According to some historians, this state of 
affairs Qasting up to the eighteenth century) was consistent with a deep suspicion of credit and a 
thorough opprobrium against persons who fell into debt. Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy 
Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355, 367 & n.39 (1986); Duffy, English Bankrupts 1511-1861, 24 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1980); Weisberg, supra note 43. But even in those days, profit-maxi-
mizing creditors might (and did) offer discharges anyway through creditors' compositions. 
Although we are accustomed to thinking of (rich) creditors as powerful and (poor) debtors as 
weak, anyone who has been a creditor knows different. The debtor has an enormous positional 
advantage over his creditors. See Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO 
L. REv. (forthcoming) (finding positional advantage of debtors the major target of fraudulent 
conveyance law). He can hide assets, make fraudulent conveyances, prefer other creditors, or 
"flee to continental towns, such as Boulogne, where there were sizable colonies of Englishmen 
waiting for ... favourable compositions." Duffy, supra, at 291. Such possibilities gave debtors 
real leverage over creditors to trade compositions for production of assets. See Cohen, The His· 
tory of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 
J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 154, 158-59 (1983) (reporting on creditor compositions in English history). 
Historians claim that by the time the earliest discharge law was introduced, the prevailing 
attitude toward credit had changed. Traders who took honest risks and lost were no longer 
hated and feared. The social utility of risk-taking came to be recognized. Weisberg, supra note 
43, at 29-34. This 1705 legislation allowed discharge of qualified debtors by class vote of credi-
tors. See Duffy, supra, at 287-91; see also Ayers, supra, at 367 & nn.40-43 (describing class votes 
in early American legislation). Therefore, to some degree, the existence of consensual discharge 
legislation may be described as replicating bargains that a lot of debtors and creditors would 
make anyway, with the additional proviso that the minority of dissenting creditors would not be 
permitted to block the benefits of a composition that most creditors preferred. 
This version of the bankruptcy discharge seems fueled by the desire to induce the debtor to 
produce assets that otherwise could be hidden, when the creditors decided it was in their class 
interest. Here the motive of discharge law seems a combination of improving the collection 
procedure and encouraging the debtor to deal honestly and openly with his creditors. Cohen, 
supra, at 156-57. This element of exchange and incentive is not absent from discharge law today. 
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II. BANKRUPTCY AS NEUTRAL FORUM 
In addition to contractarianism, Jackson has another major nor-
mative principle to push. According to Jackson, bankruptcy should 
always be neutral toward creditor rights in state law. Otherwise, "in-
centives" are created whereby firms that should not be in bankruptcy 
are pushed into it, and vice versa. 116 Large portions of Jackson's book 
are dedicated to a relentless inquisition of bankruptcy rules, to see 
which are neutral and which are not. 117 
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (only debtors who cooperate in producing assets 
are entitled to a discharge). 
The second version of bankruptcy discharges fully emerged in the 1898 Act, which forced 
discharges against the will of the creditors. It was here that creditors were forced to surrender 
their private spite for defaulting debtors. "Mandatory" discharges obviously have no basis in 
freedom of contract. At this point, discharge law passed out of a democratic-utilitarian phase 
and into a new intuitionist-liberal phase. Instead of facilitating rational agreements (against 
hold-out creditors who threatened to defeat a composition), the mandatory legislation clearly 
indicates that the bargain ought to be made, regardless of creditor opposition. This change could 
be viewed as reflecting a growth in society's confidence about the strength of its foundations. The 
nature of this change was that, earlier in history, there was great hatred for those who did not 
keep their promises, but that later people felt less threatened by default and hence more willing to 
see it forgiven. In fact, society has an important interest inforcing the injured parties (le., the 
creditors) to defer all questions of justice and punishment to the authorities, see Boshkoff, supra 
note 24, at 104, and to free up honest debtors who might make contributions to society if freed 
from debt. Ct P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 250 (1974) (debtor's 
prison harmed society by removing productive laborers from the work force). 
I have called this phase the "intuitionist-liberal" phase. What I have in mind is that the 
philosophical justification for the discharge was to preserve individuals from permanent subjuga-
tion to their creditors. This was done by making the discharge nonwaivable by the debtor. Doc-
trines of unwaivability have an obvious built-in contradiction: individuals are prevented from 
exercising the choice that individualism seeks to protect, in order to preserve the illusion of 
individualism. The idea of an unwaivable right reflects the fact that the idea of individualism is 
inherently self-contradictory as an ethical theory. Therefore, bankruptcy discharge represents a 
failure of pure liberal theory (although undoubtedly a triumph of common sense). This is the 
meaning I would give to mandatory discharge law. 
This account is not startling or original. It is a modest one, based on the orthodox historical 
view of bankruptcy discharges, with a light touch of critical theory thrown in. It relies in part on 
intuitionism - a declaration that competing values are in fact balanced and answers achieved, 
even if the balancing mechanism has not been and perhaps cannot be described. Such an explana-
tion lacks the eclat of Jackson's discovery of a single "deep structure," but at least it avoids the 
controversial theories of personality upon which Jackson so heavily depends. 
116. Pp. 21, 26, 33, 35, 57, 79, 83, 193. Ultimately, the idea of bankruptcy neutrality shares 
an important element with Jackson's efficiency-related contractarianism. In both ideas, Jackson 
aims for Paretian overtones, whereby bankruptcy is thought to harm no one and benefit at least 
one party. Thus, his contractarian model has people consenting to the rules, thereby proving that 
no one is harmed by whatever rule he is justifying. Similarly, in his bankruptcy optimum, he bids 
legislators to guarantee that no one is harmed by a bankruptcy rule. Jackson is not necessarily 
against the infliction of pain, however. He simply wants to be sure that pain is inflicted by a 
nonbankruptcy rule. P. 25. Such a Paretian bankruptcy concept depends heavily, of course, on 
Jackson's dream-world assumption that all creditors are equal under state law, so that in bank-
ruptcy all creditors gain and no one loses. I criticize this argument in the text at notes 25-32 
supra. 
117. Jackson obtained the idea of bankruptcy neutrality from Butner v. United States, 440 
U.S. 48 (1979), which Jackson quotes as follows: 
Property interests are created and defined by state Jaw. Unless some federal interest requires 
a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply 
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of 
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Although it hardly seems possible, the idea of bankruptcy neutral-
ity is even less satisfactory than Jackson's contractarian claims. This 
section will sketch out some of the major failures in the bankruptcy 
neutrality idea. 
A. There Can Be No Such Thing as Neutrality Between 
State Law and Bankruptcy 
In order for a totally neutral environment to exist whereby credi-
tors can choose between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy liquidation 




where Cs is the creditor's expected return under state (or nonbank-
ruptcy) liquidation systems, Cb is the creditor's expected return from a 
property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to ..• discourage 
forum shopping .•.. 
P. 22 (quoting Butner, 440 U.S. at 56). 
Since Jackson pins so much of his book on this dictum from the Supreme Court, it is amusing 
to consider the facts of the Butner case. Ironically, one would be hard pressed to find any bank-
ruptcy case as non-neutral as Butner, in spite of the above-quoted slogan about forum shopping. 
In Butner, the issue was whether accumulated rents from land belonged to the secured parties 
or to the bankruptcy trustee. Under North Carolina law, mortgagees have to dispossess the 
debtor before they are entitled to mortgage payments. The mortgagees (including the petitioner, 
Butner) had in fact obtained a receiver from the bankruptcy court. This receiver collected rents 
for all the mortgagees. All sides agreed that this receiver was authorized to collect rents on 
behalf of the mortgagee. See Golden Enters. v. United States, 566 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 
1977) ("Of course, there had been a receiver until the adjudication in bankruptcy and he had 
applied the rents collected, inter alia, to the payment of interest and principal on the mort-
gages."); see also 566 F.2d at 1212 (Bryan, J., dissenting) ("The next day the order was entered 
naming Simon Joseph Golden as agent 'to collect rents and to apply the proceeds' ••• to the '5. 
Interest and principal on secondary mortgages' which, of course, included appellee Butner's 
mortgage."). 
When the debtor's proceeding was converted to a liquidation, this receiver was displaced by 
the bankruptcy trustee, who terminated Butner's right to the rents. The reason Butner lost the 
rents is that he made no separate request to the bankruptcy courts for the rents after his receiver 
was displaced, even though he had obviously made this request before the receiver was displaced. 
See 566 F.2d at 1211 (Bryan, J., dissenting) ("Despite the recital of other reasons, the majority 
decision actually turns on the single axis: that appellee, the second mortgagee, failed to renew 
'during bankruptcy' a request made during the arrangement phase for a sequestration of rents for 
his benefit.") (emphasis in original). 
If there had been no conversion of the action to a bankruptcy liquidation, obviously Butner 
had qualified to receive rents. Yet it was the failure to follow a rule of bankruptcy procedure that 
did Butner in. See 566 F.2d at 1210 ("the record reflects no formal action on the part of Butner 
to proceed with foreclosure in compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 701"). 
All this went over the head of the Supreme Court, which affirmed the non-neutral result 
reached by the lower courts. The Supreme Court was very concerned to terminate a split among 
the circuits about whether any request for sequestration of rents was required at all. Some cir-
cuits held that the request must be made when state law required it. Other courts waived the 
requirement on the ground that it was a needless formality. In fact, since Butner had made the 
request required by state law (but had not followed a rule of bankruptcy procedure), there was no 
need to resolve the split among the circuits. In the end, the result in the case violated the very 
principles of bankruptcy neutrality that Jackson holds so dear. Seep. 21 (dismissing the facts of 
Butner as "unimportant"). 
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bankruptcy proceeding, while Es and Eb are the value of the entire 
estate in a state-law proceeding and in a bankruptcy-law proceeding. 
If (and only if) the above formula is true for each and every creditor, 
then (and only then) will creditors choose between state law and bank-
ruptcy law based solely on the efficiency of the competing collection 
systems. If even one creditor faces a priority regime when C;Eb =I 
C~s. then the entire legal regime is not neutral. 
Where bankruptcy treats general creditors as equal, while state law 
permits creditors to be paid or to obtain judicial liens, the above 
formula never holds. The implication of this observation is that bank-
ruptcy equality (the essence of bankruptcy, says Jackson) is itself non-
neutral in relation to state law. Therefore, the suggestion that bank-
ruptcy should have no substantive content is inherently impossible. 
This one observation alone destroys huge portions of Jackson's 
book. And yet even if it were possible to assert that the above ratios 
could be equal (where state law allows unequal payment and bank-
ruptcy insists on equal payment), there are many more objections to 
Jackson's thesis, each of which is fatal in its own right. 
B. Debtor-Creditor Federalism As a Value More Important 
Than Efficiency 
The above section assumes that Jackson uses bankruptcy neutrality 
to achieve efficiency. There is much in Jackson's book to support this 
interpretation, but, from time to time, Jackson also indicates that 
bankruptcy neutrality is not merely instrumentally useful in pursuing 
efficiency. Nonbankruptcy law may well be inefficient or even unfair, 
but Jackson still thinks that bankruptcy must never erode any state-
law entitlements. Indeed, efficiency and bankruptcy neutrality are 
contradictory principles. us 
Jackson even discusses an attractive candidate for an efficient, non-
neutral bankruptcy rule which must not be instituted: Involuntary 
creditors could be promoted over voluntary secured creditors, who 
could respond by raising interest rates to the debtor, thereby forcing 
the debtor to internalize costs. Internalized costs would by themselves 
reduce the number of bankruptcies in the long run. Jackson opposes 
this rule because it is not neutral between conflicting state-law entitle-
118. One quite excellent article that spells this out is Bulow & Shoven, The Bankruptcy Deci-
sion, 9 BELL J. EcoN. 437 (1978). In this article, the authors give examples of (a) a firm with 
going-concern value being liquidated in order to profit well-mobilized creditors, and (b) a firm 
without going-concern vajue being preserved in order to profit well-mobilized creditors. In each 
case, the bankruptcy norm of creditor equality produces contrary incentives because the well-
mobilized creditors can choose state law or bankruptcy law to produce self-serving nonefficient 
results. The implication of this article is that bankruptcy cannot be neutral and efficient at the 
same time. 
Although this article is quite imaginative, the authors leave out the possibility of a Chapter 11 
reorganization, which would change several of their examples, although not their basic point 
about the inconsistency of bankruptcy neutrality and efficiency. 
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ments (pp. 31-32, 156). Under state law, secured creditors almost al-
ways take priority over unsecured tort creditors.119 
Jackson, then, privileges a vague sort of debtor-creditor federalism 
over efficiency. If this debtor-creditor federalism is more important 
than efficient law, then Jackson really ought to have explained what 
values debtor-creditor federalism serves. Advocates of states' rights 
usually assert that state sovereignty allows for greater citizen partici-
pation and experimentation in governmental affairs than is possible in 
a national government, 120 but Jackson cannot assert these goals for his 
neutrality principle. Jackson concedes that federal law might contrib-
ute to nonbankruptcy law, as well as law produced by local govern-
ments. Therefore, bankruptcy neutrality cannot be justified by 
ordinary federalism principles. 
If I had to guess why Jackson asserts such a mysterious principle, I 
would say that Jackson views it as equally easy to legislate globally as 
to legislate a bankruptcy rule. There being no difference in effort, 
Jackson wishes to steer legislators toward the global solution. 121 If 
there is to be efficiency, let it be both in and out of bankruptcy! The 
assumption that global legislation is so easy (if indeed Jackson is guilty 
of it) ignores at least three important practicalities. First and fore-
most, certain reforms can only be done in collective proceedings. 122 
This is so with regard to the very same non-neutral bankruptcy rule 
that Jackson proclaims efficient but solemnly opposes. As stated 
above, Jackson thinks that giving tort creditors priority over commer-
cial lenders in state law might be efficient and endorses a nonbank-
ruptcy rule to this effect. But how would a "first in time" state-law 
system achieve this? In a system in which all security interests and 
judicial liens obtained by commercial lenders are susceptible to subor-
dination to any and all tort creditors, huge "marshaling of assets" 
problems arise. 123 Unless bankruptcy (or a state-law collective sys-
119. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1978). 
120. E.g., Rudenstine, Judicially Ordered Social Reform: Neofederalism and Neonationalism 
and the Debate Over Political Structure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 449, 465-68 (1986). 
121. I have deduced this premise from passages such as this one: 
Even though a nonbankruptcy rule may suffer from infirmities such as unfairness or ineffi-
ciency, if the nonbankruptcy rule does not undermine the advantages of a collective pro· 
ceeding . . . imposing a different bankruptcy rule is a second-best and perhaps a 
counterproductive solution . • . . [T]he proper approach for Congress would be to face that 
issue squarely and to overturn the rule in general, not just to undermine or reverse it in 
bankruptcy. 
Pp. 26-27. 
122. Jackson actually sees this with regard to bankruptcy discharges. Pp. 226-27. Because 
discharge concerns only debtors who are human beings, Jackson has declared bankruptcy dis· 
charges as "out of bounds" for the bankruptcy neutrality principle. This he must do if he is to 
stay true to the task of justifying the status quo. 
123. For example, suppose D commits a tort against V, so that V has a claim for $10,000. 
Meanwhile, D has pledged his only three assets (each worth $8,000) to three banks, A, B, and C 
respectively. Each bank has a secured claim of $6,000 against D. If Vis senior to the liens of A, 
B, and C: how can the banks ever foreclose on their mortgages? In a collective proceeding, this 
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tern) intervenes with a rule, it is hard to imagine how state law can 
even solve the problem of allocating bank collateral equally among 
tort creditors. Yet unless this allocation is made, creditors may over-
estimate the risk that tort creditors really pose. Therefore, prohibiting 
a bankruptcy rule about tort creditors is tantamount to ruling out the 
chance of efficient reform forever. 
A second practical objection to bankruptcy neutrality is that the 
legislator or judge in question may have jurisdiction over bankruptcy 
but not over anything else. In particular, a bankruptcy judge has the 
chance to overrule state law's bad influence by molding a federal rule 
in a bankruptcy proceeding. A bankruptcy judge who adopts Jack-
son's neutrality principle thereby freezes herself into inaction when 
she thinks action is called for. 
Finally, state legislators have limited impact in making reforms, 
partly because choice-of-law problems limit the impact of any state's 
law and partly because commercial legislation is heavily lobbied by 
special interest groups. Therefore, bankruptcy judges are being asked 
to do nothing in the hopes that palpably disempowered state legisla-
tors will make the desired debtor-creditor reforms. 
One last observation. The history of debtor-creditor law is filled 
with examples in which state law changed in order to conform with 
bankruptcy rules. 124 That is, not only is bankruptcy neutrality a bad 
strategy for reform, but the evidence shows that state courts and legis-
latures are capable of responding to the stimulus of a bankruptcy rule. 
Why does it follow that bankruptcy courts must be neutral, when state 
courts and state legislatures have the power to neutralize a bankruptcy 
rule by conforming state law to it? In short, bankruptcy neutrality 
seems anti-reform, anti-efficiency, anti-fairness. 125 All this without 
problem is easily solved, because all the parties will be part of the proceeding. Marshaling of 
assets would then easily give V her priority without visiting a disproportionate loss on either A, 
B, or C. Therefore, either bankruptcy must have a priority rule, or the state-law system of "first 
in time" must be changed into a collective proceeding. 
124. A few quick examples: (a) After Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), the drafters of the 
U.C.C. eliminated the rights of unsecured creditors against unperfected security interests. See 
U.C.C. § 9-301 (1978); Carlson & Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities Under Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, Part/, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 287, 319 (1984). (b) The Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act has recently been rewritten to conform to changes made in the Bankruptcy 
Code. See Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 195, 198-99 (1986). 
(c) "Under the dominant rule of nineteenth century common law, partnership creditors enjoyed a 
priority in the distribution of partnership assets .... This rule has come to be known as the 'jingle 
rule.' The jingle rule was included in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 .... When the Uniform 
Partnership Act was promulgated in 1914, the jingle rule was codified in it, in part so that part-
nership law would correspond to section 5(g) of the Bankruptcy Act.'' In re Safren, 65 Bankr. 
566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). Congress has reversed field again and has now repealed the jingle 
rule. 65 Bankr. at 566. 
125. "Even though a bankruptcy rule may suffer from infirmities such as unfairness or ineffi-
ciency, if the nonbankruptcy rule does not undermine the advantages of a collective proceeding 
•.. imposing a different bankruptcy rule is a second-best and perhaps counterproductive solu-
tion.'' P. 26. 
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anything resembling a convincing rationale! 
C. The Ad Hoc Nature of Debtor-Creditor Federalism 
Jackson spends a lot of pages asserting his mysterious federalism 
values over efficiency. But he also spends almost as many pages devel-
oping a whole series of efficient, non-neutral bankruptcy rules to 
which federalism is subordinated. That is, sometimes federalism is as-
serted over efficiency, and sometimes efficiency is asserted over federal-
ism. This leaves Jackson's book deeply contradictory on whether 
bankruptcy should be neutral or whether bankruptcy should be 
efficient. 
The efficient non-neutral bankruptcy rules Jackson favors include 
rules under which creditors forfeit their preferences and their posi-
tional advantages provided by state law.126 This is done, apparently, 
in the name of efficiency. Thus, after learning that state-law entitle-
ments should be honored above all things in bankruptcy, we now learn 
that state-law entitlements should be struck down when they are void-
able preferences or when they fall to the trustee's status as hypotheti-
cal lien creditor. 
Jackson does attempt a calculus to tell us when efficiency should or 
should not be asserted as the most important value. According to 
Jackson, bankruptcy should be non-neutral whenever such interfer-
ence furthers the "goal" of bankruptcy. The "goal" of bankruptcy is 
the efficient maximization of value in the debtor's estate (pp. 14-16). 
In particular, Jackson imagines that bankruptcy equality among un-
secured creditors is necessary to justify the maximization of the estate 
that bankruptcy supposedly achieves. Voidable preference law is 
therefore justified because it prevents creditors from opting out of this 
"bargain."127 
126. For example, suppose a creditor gets a lien under state law. This lien is a voidable 
preference if the debtor files for bankruptcy within 90 days. Bankruptcy therefore destroys 
nonbankruptcy entitlements in the name of efficiency. Pp. 125-26. 
127. Jackson does not have a well-developed argument in favor of the efficiency of voidable 
preference law. He has two claims. First, voidable preference law is necessary to prevent dis-
mantling the bankrupt estate. Pp. 125-26. Second, voidable preferences prevent wasteful costs of 
creditors in racing to get preferences. P. 128. 
The first point seems flat wrong. Recall that the production of value enhancement in bank-
ruptcy and entitlements to the gain are logically unrelated. If bankruptcy is designed to preserve 
going-concern value that (allegedly) cannot be achieved in state law, this could be preserved even 
if creditors who have established liens on property are given 100% of the value of liens. Credi-
tors could be forced to return the property per se, so that the estate could be maximized, but the 
preferred creditor could then be given a priority to the bankruptcy gain that is created thereafter. 
After all, Jackson favors giving secured creditors their collateral. The effect of security interests 
on the bankruptcy gain seems identical to the effect a preferential judicial lien would have. 
The second claim - legalizing preferences would encourage costs - also seems highly prob-
lematic. First, Jackson assumes that voidable preference law actually succeeds in discouraging 
creditors from attempting to get preferences. Such a claim is by no means self-evident, as Jack-
son himself commendably recognizes. Pp. 137-38. Also, Jackson does not mention the counter-
costs voidable preference law might cause. In particular, voidable preference law causes the 
trustee and other creditors to spend money to find the preferences and, in some cases, might 
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It can be seen that, even though Jackson opposes efficiency when it 
contradicts bankruptcy neutrality, efficiency is nevertheless at the 
heart of bankruptcy neutrality after all. Therefore, Jackson favors 
some non-neutral bankruptcy rules because they are efficient. He op-
poses other non-neutral rules even though the rules are efficient. 
Sometimes efficiency is good and sometimes it is bad. So-called "bank-
ruptcy" efficiencies may be pursued, but other types of efficiency may 
not be pursued. 
If efficiency is what Jackson is after, and if it is unambiguously 
achievable, why not use non-neutral bankruptcy rules to pursue it? 
For that matter, why not create all sorts of non-neutral incentives to 
encourage someone to file a bankruptcy petition, in order to make sure 
that society enjoys the efficiencies to be found there?128 
There is a second way in which Jackson's modulation between effi-
ciency and neutrality is ad hoc. He assures us that sometimes it is 
"too expensive" to be neutral. For instance, Jackson is troubled by the 
fact that unperfected security interests are void in bankruptcy, render-
ing the unperfected, secured creditor equal to the general creditor. 
Although Jackson concedes that unperfected, secured parties might 
have a big head start in a state "first in time" collection system, Jack-
son nevertheless favors (non-neutral) equal priority because non-neu-
trality is "preferable to a more costly case-by-case standard."129 This 
deduction of prohibitive cost from the existence of a non-neutral bank-
ruptcy rule may be (to be polite) mediocre sociology, 130 but it is an 
eloquent admission of the proposition that efficiency and neutrality are 
completely incompatible and contradictory ideas. 
Having admitted that bankruptcy law cannot always be neutral 
(because sometimes neutrality is too expensive), it is incumbent upon 
Jackson to explain how much neutrality is worth (assuming for the 
sake of argument that it is worth anything at all). The observation 
that "sometimes bankruptcy neutrality is too expensive and sometimes 
it's not" does not exactly enlighten us on how to tell the difference. 
justify creating a bankruptcy proceeding when, otherwise, none would occur. That voidable 
preference law is efficient is a great leap of faith by Jackson. 
128. For a typical non-neutral rule that indulges in this suggestion, see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 503(b)(3)(A) (1982) (giving creditors who file involuntary petitions reimbursement for having 
done so). 
Jackson's view is that, often, general creditors have no incentive to force a bankruptcy, even 
when bankruptcy has succeeded in maximizing the debtor's estate over state-law procedures. P. 
205. He even suggests that a (non-neutral) reward be given to shareholders if they agree to the 
filing for bankruptcy. If this is so, it seems silly to wring hands over "bad" incentives that 
encourage creditors to seek earlier bankruptcies. 
129. P. 74; see also pp. 15 n.18, 129. 
130. It's a tactic that Jackson uses repeatedly! See pp. 72-74 (it's too expensive to look into 
whether unperfected, secured parties are really better off than general creditors under state law); 
pp. 130-31 (preference statute is so rigid because cost of a more exact standard is too high); pp. 
199-200 (although cash-flow tests do not perfectly determine debtor insolvency, increased accu-
racy of alternative tests "may not be worth its costs"). 
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Jackson does not even see that he needs to tell us this. He limits his 
task to praising the Bankruptcy Code when it appears to be neutral 
and apologizing for it when it is non-neutral on the grounds that de-
duced "costs" prevent neutrality. 
D. An Inconsistent View of the Efficiency of Bankruptcy 
Although Jackson sometimes claims that bankruptcy neutrality is 
different from and privileged over wealth maximization, Jackson as-
serts (inconsistently) that the purpose of bankruptcy is wealth max-
imization (pp. 12-14). But if bankruptcy were always efficient in 
comparison to the nonbankruptcy liquidation procedure, wouldn't in-
centives leading creditors toward bankruptcy be a good thing? 
Jackson repeats again and again that he hates such incentives, 
however. His stated reason: even though bankruptcy exists because it 
is more efficient than nonbankruptcy liquidation alternatives, never-
theless there are inefficient bankruptcies that could occur if creditors 
have non-neutral bankruptcy rights. Jackson writes: "The concern 
[with non-neutral bankruptcy rules] ... is not simply distributional-
that some creditors would win and some would lose - but that the 
creditors as a group would suffer a net loss because the incentives for 
strategic use of bankruptcy by individual creditors would increase" (p. 
79). 
In this passage, Jackson asserts that there is such a thing as ineffi-
cient bankruptcy. Jackson never describes what he means by ineffi-
cient bankruptcies. He does state that bankruptcy is efficient because 
(1) the creditors supposedly bear fewer aggregate enforcement costs in 
bankruptcies (compared with the state-law alternatives), and (2) bank-
ruptcies can capture going-concern value from creditors who would 
like to liquidate (whereas state-law systems supposedly cannot) (p. 14). 
Not all bankruptcies involve going-concern value. Chapter 7 liquida-
tions can occur with or without it. It therefore follows, by process of 
elimination, that Jackson must think that in some bankruptcies aggre-
gate creditor enforcement costs would be lower if the firm were liqui-
dated under nonbankruptcy law. If I have successfully guessed the 
nature of an inefficient bankruptcy, then obviously whether bank-
ruptcy or state-law procedures are wealth-maximizing must be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis. Bankruptcy neutrality therefore seems 
aimed at guaranteeing that the choice made by creditors (bankruptcy 
or no bankruptcy) will be efficient. 
If this is what Jackson means when he denounces disincentives, I 
find several things wrong with the account. First, if bankruptcy is effi-
cient most of the time, then aren't non-neutral incentives good most of 
the time as well? Under the standard precepts of rule utilitarianism, 
bankruptcy neutrality is a bad idea, unless bankruptcy is inefficient 
precisely as often as it is efficient, in which case one may wonder (from 
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a utilitarian point of view) whether there should be a Bankruptcy 
Code at all. 
Second, Jackson assumes that every non-neutral law produces a 
result in society. It could be, however, that the cost to the creditor of 
precipitating an involuntary (inefficient) bankruptcy far outweighs the 
benefit received from the non-neutral bankruptcy rule. As evidence of 
the fact that bankruptcy law might be irrelevant to the conduct of 
creditors much of the time, I can cite the fact that a vast majority of 
bankruptcy petitions are voluntary petitions filed by debtors, not cred-
itors. With plenty of incentives for unpaid creditors to prefer bank-
ruptcy - voidable preference law, priorities, and the like - creditors 
do not seem to be reacting in the way Jackson predicts. It seems that 
debtors are practically the only people deciding whether bankruptcy is 
a good thing. 
Third, the choice between bankruptcy or state-law alternatives 
seems like a false dichotomy. In fact, creditors face at least seven 
choices: (a) privately negotiated loan workouts, (b) privately negoti-
ated liquidations, refinancings, payments, and the like, (c) bankruptcy 
liquidation, (d) bankruptcy reorganization, (e) nonbankruptcy liquida-
tion pursuant to legal process, (f) state-law receiverships designed to 
preserve going-concern value, and (g) doing nothing to enforce the 
debt at all. Even within these categories, there are numerous subdivi-
sions that are possible, such as contesting a Chapter 11 plan, voting 
against the plan, voting for the plan, obtaining a Chapter 11 trustee, 
and so forth. Jackson's limited notion that non-neutral bankruptcy 
rules skew the choice between bankruptcy ve/ non radically un-
derdescribes the choices that real creditors face. 
E. The Theory of the Second Best 
Jackson's neutrality position has a further problem which he does 
not acknowledge - the problem of the "second best." The second-
best problem arises whenever there is more than one evil tendency in 
the world. In equilibrium theories, two wrongs most definitely consti-
tute a right! Thus, a disincentive that moves people away from the 
optimum131 in the abstract may actually be helpful, because it coun-
ters the bad effect of another bad incentive. The theory of the second 
best, then, tells us that it is never enough to proclaim a tendency 
nonoptimal. The analyst must also demonstrate that the tendency is 
not needed to counteract some other, more serious counter-
tendency.132 
131. Of course, Jackson's optimum is C,Eb = C,,E,, which is inherently impossible if general 
creditors are treated as equals. See Part II.A supra. The critique in the text presupposes, for the 
sake of argument, the coherency of Jackson's optimization claims. 
132. Arthur Leif has written a trenchant description of the second-best problem: "If a state 
of affairs is the product of n variables, and you have knowledge of or control over less than n 
variables, if you think you know what's going to happen when you vary "your" variables, you're 
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The implication of the theory of the second best for Jackson's book 
is that Jackson cannot pick out disincentives and urge their repeal in 
the abstract. To do so could produce just the opposite effect from 
what Jackson intends. Therefore, taking a position against any given 
incentive without also taking a generic position on the balance and 
counter-balance of all incentives can never be justified by the nature of 
true neutrality. Neutrality can only serve as a convincing slogan in a 
"vacuum of fact." 133 
Before bankruptcy neutrality can even begin to make sense, Jack-
son has to assure us that he has succeeded in removing every non-
neutral bankruptcy rule. If he allows even one non-neutral rule to 
survive, removing any countervailing incentive is inefficient. Yet Jack-
son explicitly endorses lots of non-neutral rules (such as avoiding pref-
erences). Because Jackson is not serious about eliminating all 
disincentives for and against bankruptcy, it is worse than useless for 
him to assert bankruptcy neutrality on an ad hoc basis. 
F. The Indeterminacy of State Law and the Impossibility 
of Neutrality 
According to Jackson, bankruptcy courts should find out precisely 
what rights creditors have at state law and then guarantee them at 
least that much in bankruptcy. This view presupposes that state law is 
determinate and yields an answer. In making this assertion, Jackson 
ignores almost eighty years of legal realism and (more recently) criti-
cal legal theory. 
Most modem philosophers of law would tend to agree that 
[i]t will always be possible to find, retrospectively, more or less convinc-
ing ways to make a set of distinctions, or failures to distinguish, look 
credible. A common experience testifies to this possibility; every 
thoughtful law student or lawyer has had the disquieting sense of being 
able to argue too well or too easily for too many conflicting notions.134 
This is no less true with regard to debtor-creditor law. Equity courts 
in particular have always been heavily involved in debt collection. Eq-
uity jurisprudence is full of slogans, such as "equity abhors a forfei-
ture" or "clean hands," which justify reversing a result that someone 
a booby." Leif, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 
451, 476 (1974). 
Second·best problems are everywhere. The Iaw.and·economics movement almost always ig· 
nores these problems, negating any claims to utilitarian truth that such scholarship might make. 
For two excellent (if difficult) essays on second·best problems lurking in microeconomic analysis, 
see Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in our Worse·than·Second-
Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law a11d 
Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 950; Markovits, supra note 94. 
133. See Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial 
Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985) (exploring second-best factors that 
militate in favor of allowing creditors to take security). 
134. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 570 (1983). 
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claims under state law. Indeed, it is safe to say that the whole purpose 
of equity is to render the law indeterminate. 
If it is true that the law is indeterminate, not just some of the time, 
but all of the time, then Jackson's neutrality principle is useless. 135 
Inevitably, the bankruptcy judge must mediate between conflicting 
state-law norms. This mediation can be accomplished only through 
the use of some theory or intuition that is not part of the neutrality 
principle. 136 
In short, Jackson's neutrality principle reduces to atavistic formal-
ism - the idea that neutral judges can simply consult the law and find 
the answer, without ever having to exercise judgment. Formalist legal 
theory has not been respectable since Roscoe Pound demolished it way 
back in the Roosevelt administration.137 Yet if there is any difference 
between Jackson's bankruptcy neutrality theory and the "mechanical 
jurisprudence" Pound denounced, it is not a difference that I can 
135. "The economist will ask the lawyer 'what the law is' with respect to a particular exter-
nality. If the lawyer says, 'this is a case of first impression,' or 'there is no law,' the economist 
cannot proceed." Kennedy, supra note 29, at 430 n.103. 
136. To put the indeterminacy of state law to the test, let me take as a challenge Jackson's 
assertion that state law guarantees secured creditors their opportunity cost. The implication of 
this view is that, under principles of bankruptcy neutrality, undersecured creditors should get 
paid postbankruptcy interest so long as the trustee retains the collateral or proceeds of the collat-
eral. Pp. 184-85; Jackson, supra note 17, at 876. Presumably this view is based on the right of 
the secured party to repossess and sell. See U.C.C. §§ 9-501, 9-504 (1978). The secured party 
then presumably invests the proceeds in his most profitable opportunity. 
It is possible to argue that opportunity cost depends upon how quickly the undersecured 
party really could get her hands on the proceeds. Until then, the undersecured party has no 
opportunity cost. The debtor, however, does not have to hand over the collateral immediately. 
The debtor can threaten a breach of the peace, in which case the secured party must get replevin. 
See U.C.C. § 9-505 (1978). If the debtor takes every appeal and finds every way to delay, the 
time after which the secured party obtains an opportunity cost is delayed. Even if eventually the 
secured party must get her hands on the proceeds from the collateral, the debtor, consistent with 
state law creatively used, is entitled to impose all sorts of defense costs against the secured party, 
which should properly be offset against the opportunity cost. See D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 
71 CALIF. L. REv. l, 33-34 (1983) (defendants have systematic advantage in imposing litigation 
costs on plaintiffs). Cf. p. 72 (Jackson uses this argument to show that unperfected, secured 
parties are no better situated than unsecured creditors, so that the trustee's power to destroy the 
unperfected interest is justified). 
We can go further. If the debtor possesses the collateral, the debtor can deny the creditor her 
opportunity to sell the collateral and reinvest by blowing up the collateral with dynamite. 
Granted, such behavior by the debtor is not lawful, but why should counterfactual prediction be 
bounded by the unrealistic assumption that debtors never break the law? Nothing in the rules of 
counterfactual historicism requires, or even recommends, such an assumption. Any policy 
maker trying to predict the future would be counted very foolish indeed if she always assumed 
that human agents act consistently with the dictates of the law. 
Therefore, just because a secured party under state law theoretically gets to sell the collateral 
does not prove that state law (by itself) dictates or guarantees that the secured party always has 
the opportunity to do so. I maintain that this argument suffices to deny any undersecured party 
all or part of her opportunity costs (on the theory that state law dictates that she get it). 
137. Theodore Roosevelt, that is! See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 
605 (1908). John Stick has written: "critical legal studies should be spending its time with tradi-
tional scholarship about politics, not about methodological issues. Mechanical jurisprudence has 
already been defeated." Stick, supra note 52, at 399-400. No falser words have ever been 
published. 
1388 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1341 
discem.138 
III. CONCLUSION 
Thomas Jackson has written an unremittingly dreadful book. Let 
me quickly summarize the reasons why. 
Jackson's project is to find the essences of bankruptcy law, prove 
that those essences are rational, usually by a contractarian claim, and 
use those essences to club to death the numerous exceptions he finds 
138. An interesting rehabilitative strategy that is beyond the scope of this review (and not 
undertaken in Jackson's book) is that "state law" is not the hopelessly conflicting doctrines to be 
found in state statutes and judicial decisions. Rather, state law is a prediction of what state-law 
judges will do. Under this view, bankruptcy judges are required to guess, diversity-style, how 
human beings (state-law judges) would mediate between conflicting doctrines. Whereas doctrine 
is indeterminate, judicial behavior can become relatively predictable. See Yablon, The Indeter· 
minacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of Legal Explanation, 6 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 917 (1985) (arguing that the law is simultaneously indeterminate and potentially predict· 
able). 
I have three preliminary comments on such a strategy for rehabilitating the possibility (if not 
the point) of bankruptcy neutrality. (1) Substituting predictions of behavior for doctrine presup· 
poses that the bankruptcy judge is not a state-law judge and may never contribute to the creation 
of state-law rules. This assumption is contrary to experience, since bankruptcy judges do have a 
great deal of influence over the commercial law applied by state courts. Accordingly, a bank· 
ruptcy judge may justifiably perceive that she is a state-law judge, in the sense of contributing 
influential interpretations of state commercial law. If the same bankruptcy judge also believes in 
bankruptcy neutrality, then she faces the dilemma of following the "law," which is a prediction 
of what she herself will do. To restate the dilemma, under the legal realist view of state law, is 
the law what the judge does, or is the law what others (not the judge) predict the judge will do? 
The first view suggests that state law is indeterminate, since the judge can do whatever she feels 
like. The second view (the "legal realist becomes judge" view) is equally indeterminate: 
The Realist judge •.. must base her prediction on nothing but the proposition that she will 
interpret the law to be what she predicts her own interpretation will be; that is, that she will 
interpret the law to be what she will interpret it to be. And the incoherence in this theory of 
interpretation is not that she cannot get it right, but that she cannot get it wrong, because 
the only material on which the prediction may be based is the prediction itself. 
Luban, Fish v. Fish or, Some Realism About Idealism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 693, 698 n.20 (1986) 
(emphasis in original). 
(2) Whenever Bayesian policy scientists predict the future of human will, they usually ac-
count for uncertainty by discounting for the risk that the prediction might be wrong. For in· 
stance, a bankruptcy judge might be only 70% sure of what a state judge would do (or 70% sure 
of what she predicts she, as a state-law judge, will do). Accordingly, it follows that bankruptcy 
neutrality should award the winning party a 70% entitlement and the losing party a 30% entitle· 
ment. There is no reason to require an "all or nothing" element to the legal realist exercise. See 
Orloff & Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 
131 U. PA. L. REv. 1159, 1160 (1983) (analyzing this approach to liability). 
(3) If a bankruptcy judge tries to figure out what judges will do (and not what doctrine says 
the judge should do), bankruptcy judges will have to account for the phenomenon that all com· 
mercial lawyers experience: state-law judges often make mistakes in applying doctrinal ideas 
(which they would not make if they had been sufficiently educated before res judicata set in). 
E.g .. In re Alberto, 66 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985) (Article 9 financing statement not good 
enough to beat trustee's hypothetical lien creditor power whenever the collateral falls under the 
Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, a palpably "wrong" statement of law). Therefore, in pursuit of 
replicating what state-law judges would do, should the bankruptcy judge anticipate the mistakes 
and deliberately award victory to the wrong side from time to time, or should the judge simply 
apply the doctrine in a scientific way, on the assumption that that is what enlightened state-law 
judges would do? The latter strategy simply reintroduces formalism, which is the very ghost we 
are trying to exorcise in this footnote. The former, however, is likely to infuriate the losing side. 
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that render bankruptcy law nonsystematic. But system alone, aside 
from its aesthetic appeal, is worthless. Jackson must explain to us the 
ethical norms that fuel these systems. Much of the time, Jackson does 
not bother to do so, leaving it to the reader to guess why his principles 
are indeed worth following. The principal norms seem to be some-
times utilitarianism, sometimes political science notions about federal-
ism, and sometimes individualistic values separate from and hostile to 
utilitarianism. These norms will conflict frequently, but Jackson gives 
no justification for privileging one norm over another. 
Meanwhile, contractarianism pervades Jackson's work and gives 
the appearance of a coherent deep structure, but it is a sham. Some-
times Jackson makes up contracts in pursuit of efficiency and some-
times he makes up contracts in pursuit of protecting the individual 
against the ruthless logic of contracts. Jackson is able to come up with 
contracts because he is willing to change the parameters of his ethical 
and psychological theories to get the result he wants. 
The whole idea of finding a deep structure in a complicated, his-
toric artifact such as the Bankruptcy Code was doomed from the 
start. 139 Considering the tens of thousands of congressmen, judges 
and lawyers who have contributed to the content of bankruptcy law, it 
would have been a miracle if all of them were driven by the same 
ethical impulse every time a legislative decision was made.140 Legal 
texts are situated in history, and just as historical explanation is infi-
nitely complex, so should we expect jurisprudential explanations to be 
infinitely complex, based on entropy, anomie, conflict, and confusion, 
as well as the dictates of logic and reason. 
139. Some readers of this essay have complained that just because Jackson has failed to dis-
cover bankruptcy's deep structure does not prove it isn't there. Indeed, the assertion that there 
are no deep structures in law is itself a "deep structure" that disproves the very maxim asserted. 
Nevertheless, I wish to state my faith that no one will ever find"the one and only principle that 
explains bankruptcy law, for roughly the same reasons that I don't think history is ever explica-
ble by a single driving principle. 
140. Here I paraphrase Unger, supra note 134, at 571. Nietzsche called Jackson's type of 
thinking Egyptianism - "the absence of historical sense, a hatred for the idea of development." 
F. NIETZSCHE, TwlLlGHT OF THE IDOLS 1, quoted in M. FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-
MEMORY, PRACTICE 156 (1977). 
